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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Saint Alphonsus disagrees with the statement of the case set forth in the brief-in-chief
submitted by Appellant Ada County ("County"), and provides its own Statement of the Case,
Procedural History, and Statement of Facts as follows.

A.

Statement of the Case
This is a medical indigency case where Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("Saint

Alphonsus") sought judicial review of the Board of Ada County Commissioners' ("the Board")
Final Determination of Denial for County Assistance, which determined that the vast majority of
dates of service provided to the Patient by Saint Alphonsus were not compensable as "necessary
medical services" under Idaho Code §31-3502(18), contending that the Patient could have been
transferred to a lower level of care, despite the fact that the record reflected that the Patient
lacked funding to transfer elsewhere.
Saint Alphonsus sought judicial review of the Board's determination before the District
Court, which reversed the Board's decision. The County now appeals to this Court.

B.

Procedural History
1.

Procedural History before the Ada County Board of Commissioners.

The Patient was treated at Saint Alphonsus from October 7, 201 7 to January 12, 2018. 1
Agency Record ("AR") 5, 7, 14, 24-25 & 336. On April 11, 2018, based on an application for

1

Saint Alphonsus did not seek review regarding the dates of care from January 1, 2018 through
January 12, 2018; further, the initial dates of care from October 7, 2017 through October 10,
2017 were previously approved by the County. (AR 6-7.) Thus, the only dates of service
actually at issue in this matter are October 11 through December 31, 2017.
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medical indigency assistance submitted by Saint Alphonsus, the County issued an Initial
Determination of Approval for County Assistance for just the first four days of the total eightyfive days of care provided to the Patient. AR 6-7. In conjunction therewith, the Board also
issued an Initial Determination of Denial for the remaining eighty-one days of care (October 11,
2017 to December 31, 201 7), finding that the Patient was medically indigent but nevertheless
denying those dates of service based upon the contention that the care was "not medically
necessary according to Idaho Medical Review, LLC, because the patient was clearly ready for
transfer to subacute rehabilitation on October 10, 2017 but had no funding" and that "[t]he
remainder of the acute inpatient stay through December 31, 201 7 is considered not medically
necessary but had no funding." AR 4-5, referencing April 22, 2018 report of Doug Dammrose,
MD (AR 24-27.) Saint Alphonsus timely appealed the denial of the October 11 to December 31,
2017 dates to the Board of County Commissioners for a final determination. AR 391.
On October 17, 2018, Saint Alphonsus participated in an appeal hearing regarding the
Board's determination that all services provided for the two and a half months after October 10,
2017 were not medically necessary. See generally, Medical Indigency Hearing - Executive
Session, Transcript of Medical Indigency Case No. 1804-071 ("Agency Tr."), October 17, 2018.
Counsel for Saint Alphonsus argued that Dr. Dammrose' s opinion, on which the denial for
services was based, was incorrect, such that the entire amount should be approved for dates of
service October 11 through December 31, 201 7, because the Patient had no funding and thereby
was unable to move to a lower level of care. Id. at 11. 5: 12-7 :22 Counsel also noted that as Dr.
Dammrose failed to provide guidance as to why he chose October 10, 2017 as the cutoff date, as
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his own report identified October 19, 2017 as the date the patient was purportedly a potential
candidate for inpatient rehabilitation. Id. Saint Alphonsus also informed the Board that a similar
matter involving Saint Luke's Health Systems, Ltd. was on appeal before the Idaho State
Supreme Court on a denial of a request for payments for service as being not "necessary medical
services." Id. The Board granted a continuance until such time as the St. Luke's case could be
decided. 2 Id. at 11. 8:14-10:22.
On March 27, 2019, the Board conducted another hearing. Counsel for Saint Alphonsus
argued that this Court's decision in St. Luke's unfortunately provided no firm guidance for the
resolution of the dispute at issue. Agency Tr., March 27, 2019, 11. 4:1-5:21, & 6:9-18. Counsel
for Saint Alphonsus further again argued the undisputed fact that despite the Patient being ready
for transfer to a subacute facility, she had no funding, and thus was unable to be transferred. Id.
at 4. As such, there was no available facility to which the Patient could be transferred, nor did
Dr. Dammrose identify an alternative facility. Id. Counsel for Saint Alphonsus further argued
that the statute governing "necessary medical care" did not expressly address "subacute" or
rehabilitative care. Id. The Board took it under advisement. Id. at 11. 6:19-23.

2

This referenced litigation involving St. Luke's was ruled upon by this Court on February 27,
2019, in Re: Med. Indigency Application of C.H., 164 Idaho 801, 802, 435 P.3d 1121, 1122
(2019). In that decision, no decision on the merits was reached at that juncture; instead, this
Court vacated the Gem County Board's decision and remanded the matter, due to a failure to
specific in the denial the basis for the denial. That matter is now again pending on appeal. See
St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. vs. Board of Commissioners of Gem County, Idaho, Supreme
Court Docket No. 47872-2020.
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On April 24, 2019, the Board maintained its initial denial of payment as to dates of
service October 11, 2017 through December 31, 2017. 3

AR 516.

A Final Determination

thereafter was prepared and served by mail on April 29, 2019, which Final Determination
incorrectly stated that there had been "no appearance by the Third Party Applicant, the Patient or
the providers at the appeal hearing[.]" AR 516.
2.

Procedural History Before the District Court.

The Board's Final Determination was thereafter timely appealed by Saint Alphonsus.
Court Record ("CR") 5-7. Saint Alphonsus' opening brief was submitted on August 31, 2019;
the County filed its responsive brief on September 10, 2019; and Saint Alphonsus submitted its
reply brief on October 1, 2019. See CR 41-64 & 67-90. Argument was thereafter held before
the District Court on November 12, 2019. Court Tr., 11/12/19 Hearing.
The District Court issued its Opinion on Judicial Review on February 3, 2020 (CR 95113), reversing the decision of the Board and finding that "[t]he Board's findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions were made in excess of statutory authority, were made upon unlawful
procedure, were not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and were
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion" and that "St. Alphonsus has demonstrated its

3

The Board's final decision erroneously states that "there being no appearance by the Third
Party Applicant, the Patient, or the providers at the appeal hearing[.]" AR 516. However,
undersigned counsel was actually present at the March 27, 2019 hearing, with three Saint
Alphonsus personnel, and made argument regarding the application on appeal. See generally,
Agency Tr., March 27, 2019. However, the Board's Final Determination of Denial adopts the
basis for the denial as set forth in the Initial Determination issued on April 11, 2018 (AR 4),
which outlines the basis for the denial (as outlined above); accordingly, this error in the Final
Determination does not impact the issue at hand.
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substantial rights were prejudiced by the decision of the Board." CR 111. Specifically, the
District Court held that, under I.C. §31-3502(18), "[ o]nly services actually available to a patient
are considered for purposes of what services are most cost-effective" (CR 108, emphasis added),
and that the County's denial of 'subacute rehabilitation' services was statutorily incorrect. (CR
109: "Nothing in the patient's medical records indicates that the treatment received falls under
Section 31-3502(18)B.").
The County thereafter filed this instant appeal on March 9, 2020. CR 114-118.

C.

Statement of Facts
Patient was treated at Saint Alphonsus from October 7, 2017 through January 12, 2018

for acute liver failure. See generally, AR 33-350. There is no dispute that the Patient is an
indigent resident of the State of Idaho, and that Ada County is the obligated county under Idaho
Code §31-3506. AR 4 & 6. The County partially approved the Application with respect to
certain treatment rendered to the Patient from October 7, 2017 through October 10, 2017, the
first four days out of the total eighty-five days of care the Patient received. Id. at 6-7. However,
the Board denied the remaining dates (October 11, 2017 through December 31, 2017), resulting
in a partial approval of the application of just $33,186.62, and a denial of the remaining
$282,480.35. Id. at 4-7 & 479.
The Patient was admitted emergently on October 7, 2017. AR 32. She complained of
fatigue, weakness, and bilateral leg pain; her abdomen was distended, and her eyes were
jaundiced. Id. She was thereafter admitted to the hospital in guarded condition. Id. at 40. She
was ultimately diagnosed as having acute liver failure, with a "[l]ow threshold to transfer to the
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ICU if she decompensates." Id. at 55. The Patient was subsequently stabilized to the point of
being able to be transferred to the medical floor on October 10. Id. at 74. Additional concern
was raised that the Patient had severe esophagitis with possible ulceration, requiring a continuous
drip of Protonix. Id. at 75. Ulceration was subsequently confirmed on October 11, at which time
her treating physicians also attempted to address ongoing malnutrition without central catheter
placement. Id. at 76. Ongoing care was also provided with respect to various other diagnoses,
including acute kidney injury and dysphagia, as well as evaluation of whether the Patient was
suffering from encephalopathy. E.g., id. at 76-77. As treatment continued, concern was raised
that she was potentially unable to "comprehend her current medical situation or its gravity," and
that Patient was had ongoing confusion issues. Id. at 88, 91 & 95-96. In ongoing efforts to
identify potential care that might be available to the Patient, it was noted that she had "limited
options based on not having a payer." Id. at 102. On October 19, 2017, it was determined that
"Patient did not have funding." Id. at 105. It was also noted that "rehab is not an option unless
she is accepted by our own rehabilitation team." Id. Subacute rehabilitation was recommended,
but it was also noted that "placement is an issue." Id. at 108. The difficulties with placement, as
a result of the Patient's lack of funding, was further noted in Progress Notes on October 27,
2017, which indicated that "Patient is medically stable and ready for discharge. We continue to
explore our discharge options. The patient does not have funding; therefore, we do have limited
options with respect to subacute rehabilitation." Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
The inability to place the Patient in an alternative setting was noted on multiple
occasions. For example, on October 31, it was noted that "she is unfunded and would not be
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accepted to community-based skilled nursing facility." AR 130. Progress notes on November
13, 201 7 reflect that "the patient continues to work with Physical Therapy in the hospital as she
does not have funding for discharge to [an] outpatient facility." AR 165 (emphasis added).
Progress notes on December 15, 2017 indicate the Patient was "medically cleared, waiting for
placement." Id. at 249. Progress notes on December 20, 2017 comment that "[s]he continued to
work with physical therapy here in the hospital as she is not strong enough to go home and does
not have funding for discharge to an outpatient facility." Id. at 257 (emphasis added). Progress
notes on January 3, 2019 indicate that "[s]he has now been here in the hospital for over 11 weeks
and has been medically ready for discharge for several weeks. She continues to be in the hospital
for ongoing therapies given the lack of a safe discharge plan. She is not strong enough to go
home yet and does not have funding to discharge to an outpatient rehab facility." Id. at 302. She
was ultimately discharged on January 12, 2018, having reached a point of medical stability
sufficient to be discharged home. AR 334 & 336-350.
Following the filing of a medical indigency application for the Patient, a utilization
management review was undertaken by the County's contractor, Dr. Dammrose, who issued a 2page opinion on April 22, 2018. AR 24-27. The review determined that the care provided from
October 7, 2017 to October 10, 2017 and inpatient hospitalization including ancillary services
were medically necessary and emergent, but that "[t]he patient was clearly ready for a transfer to
subacute rehabilitation on 10/10 but had no funding. The remainder of the acute inpatient stay
through 12/31/2017 (and 01/12/2018) is considered not medically necessary for purposes of
payment." Id. It is unclear from the report as to how Dr. Dammrose came to the determination
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that October 10, 2017 was the cutoff date, when records reflect that the Patient did not become a
potential candidate for transfer to rehabilitation until October 19, 2017 (a fact apparently even
recognized by Dr. Dammrose). AR 105; compare with AR 24 (Dammrose Report: "She was
considered a potential candidate for inpatient rehabilitation on 10/19, but had no funding for it,
and St. Alphonsus subacute rehabilitation refused her due to a probable long stay.") Further, Dr.
Dammrose opined only that the Patient could have transferred to a lower level care as of October
1O; his report, however, fails to indicate that care at any such lower level facility was actually
available to this Patient. Id. Likewise, the County did not present any evidence suggesting or
otherwise even claiming that there was a more cost-effective care facility actually available to
treat the Patient. See generally Agency Tr., October 17, 2018 & March 27, 2019; AR 4-5 & 516.
Neither did Dr. Dammrose or the County specifically identify any subacute care facility option
for transfer after October 10, 2017, to where the Patient actually could have transferred despite
her lack of funding. See generally, Id. Additionally, neither Dr. Dammrose nor the County
contend that Saint Alphonsus' not placing the Patient at a different facility or discharging her
prior to January 12, 2018 was inappropriate or insufficiently diligent. Id.
The Board ultimately upheld its Initial Denial on April 24, 2019, denying payment for
dates of service October 11, 2017 through December 31, 2017. AR 516.
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

A.

Additional issues on appeal.

Saint Alphonsus does not identify any additional issues on appeal. However, for the sake
of completeness, Saint Alphonsus notes that the Issues on Appeal, as presented by it to the
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District Court, were as follows, which issues Saint Alphonsus intends to reiterate in arguing this
appeal and in requesting that this Court affirm the decision of the District Court:
1.

Whether the Board violated statutory provisions and exceeded its statutory
authority in denying dates of service October 11, 2017 through December 31,
2017, where no subacute facility was actually available to the Patient.

2.

Whether the Board's decision to deny dates of Service October 11, 2017 through
December 31, 2017 was based on substantial evidence or was arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of discretion.

3.

Whether the Board prejudiced Saint Alphonsus' substantial rights in denying
dates of Service October 11, 2017 through December 31, 2017.

CR51.
B.

Attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

Saint Alphonsus requests an award of costs as a matter of right as the prevailing party,
pursuant to I.A.R. 40.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

"A county's denial of an application for indigency benefits is reviewed under the
Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Nez
Perce Cnty. Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 215, 216, 61 P.3d 572, 573 (2002). "Judicial review of an
administrative order is limited to the record." Shobe v. Ada Cnty Bd. of Comm'rs, 130 Idaho
580, 583, 944 P.2d 715, 718 (1997). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an appellant is
entitled to relief if the county's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions were (1) in
violation of statutory or constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the
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commissioners; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) not supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole; or (5) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Saint Alphonsus
Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Elmore Cnty.. 158 Idaho 648, 350 P.3d 1025 (2015) (quoting I.C. §675279(3)).
"Evidence is substantial and competent only if a reasonable mind might accept such
evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. To establish whether an agency's action is
supported by substantial and competent evidence, this Court must determine whether the
agency's findings of fact are reasonable." Cooper v. Bd. of Profl Discipline of Idaho State Bd.
of Med., 134 Idaho 449, 456, 4 P.3d 561, 568 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

Accordingly, "[a] finding of fact without any basis in the record [is] clearly

erroneous." Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 62, 831 P.2d 527, 530 (1992) (citations omitted).
"Also, a finding of fact lacking substantial and competent evidence to support it is clearly
erroneous." Id. In order to uphold the County's decision under the clearly erroneous standard, the
Court must conclude that the record contains "some reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
in support of its position." Idaho Cnty. Nursing Home v. Dep't of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho
933, 821 P.2d 988 (1991).
On issues of law and statutory interpretation, an appellate court freely reviews the
interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts. See St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v.
Bd. of Comm'rs of Ada Cnty .. 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009).

As to the

questions of fact, judicial review of an administrative order is limited to the record, and the
reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE BRIEF - 10

Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495, 496-497, 903 P.2d 84, 85-86 (1995)). A reviewing
court may reverse the county's decision only if the substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced. LC. §67-5279(4). Finally, "[i]fthe agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside,
in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." LC. §67-5279(3).
"This Court reviews an agency's decision independently of the district court's appellate
decision." Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho at 497.
B.

The County Has Not Challenged the Court's Second Determinative Conclusion.

On judicial review, the District Court summarized the County's position as follows:
[T]he Board argues only two bases for denying reimbursement, both of which rely
on Section 31-3502. First, the Board argues that the services provided the patient
were not "the most cost-effective service or sequence of services." Id. § 313502(18)A(e). Second, the Board argues that even if the services are "the most
cost effective service or sequence of services," they are not "necessary medical
services" because the kind of services here are excluded by Section 313502( 18)B. Both of the Board's arguments fail.
CR 101-102. After rejecting the Board's first argument (as discussed further below), the District
Court also went on to reject the Board's second argument, noting that the particular care being
denied was not actually set forth in the 'not medically necessary' definition of LC. §31-3502(18):
Section 31-3502(18)B specifically excludes some services from being "necessary
medical services and supplies" and so these expenses are ineligible for
reimbursement. Nothing in the patient's medical records indicates that the
treatment received falls under Section 31-3502(18)B.
The Legislature decided to include a portion of the statute listing specific
exclusions to reimbursement. The Legislature's decision not to include
"subacute rehabilitation" or "rehabilitation" within that list is enough for
the present analysis.
CR 109 (emphasis added). The District Court correctly interpreted the cited statute, as the actual
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kinds of care defined as 'not medically necessary' under LC. §31-3502(18)(B) are specifically
enumerated, and do not include rehabilitation care:
B. Necessary medical services shall not include the following:
(a) Bone marrow transplants;
(b) Organ transplants;
(c) Elective, cosmetic and/or experimental procedures;
(d) Services related to, or provided by, residential, skilled nursing,
assisted living and/or shelter care facilities;
(e) Normal, uncomplicated pregnancies, excluding caesarean section,
and childbirth well-baby care;
(f) Medicare copayments and deductibles;
(g) Services provided by, or available to, an applicant from state,
federal and local health programs;
(h) Medicaid copayments and deductibles; and
(i) Drugs, devices or procedures primarily utilized for weight reduction
and complications directly related to such drugs, devices or procedures.
I.C. §31-3502(18)(B). Despite this plain and express language of the statute, the dates at issue in
the Patient's application were denied as "not medically necessary according to Idaho Medical
Review, LLC, because the patient was clearly ready for transfer to subacute rehabilitation on
October 10, 2017 but had no funding" and that "[t]he remainder of the acute inpatient stay
through December 31, 2017 is considered not medically necessary but had no funding." AR 4-5,

referencing report of Doug Dammrose, MD (AR 24-27)( emphases added).
As correctly noted by the District Court, nowhere within LC. §31-3502(1 S)(B) is
"subacute" or "rehabilitation" listed as a 'not medically necessary service. ' 4

4

CR 109.

In

As an aside, under unrelated Idaho regulations, "subacute" is connected to "acute" and
"intermediate" care facilities and is separated from "home health services and outpatient clinics,"
"nursing homes," and "rehabilitation services," among others. IDAPA 04.12.01.005.04(a).
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contrast, the statute does specifically enumerate, for example, "residential," "skilled nursing,"
"assisted living" and "shelter care facilities."

LC. §3 l-3502(18)(B)(d).

It is a universally

recognized rule of construction that where a statute specifies certain things, the designation of
such things excludes all others. See, e.g., KGF Dev., LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524,
528, 236 P.3d 1284, 1288 (2010), quoting Local 1494 of Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978).

The erroneous statutory

presumption made by Dr. Dammrose and the Board is that anything less than "acute" (including
rehabilitation services) is not a "necessary medical service."

However, the actual express

language of the statute contains no limitation for "acute care" within the "necessary medical
care" section, nor any delineation of "subacute" or "rehabilitation" in the exclusionary
subsection. 5
Given that any "subacute" and/or "rehabilitation" care provided within a hospital setting
(here, Saint Alphonsus) is not included within the specifically defined category of "not medically
necessary," the dates of service of October 11 through December 31, 2017 should not have been

5

In fact, the only usage of "acute" within LC. §31-3502 is in subsection (20), which provides:
"'Primary and preventive health care' means the provision of professional health services
that include health education and disease prevention, initial assessment of health problems,
treatment of acute and chronic health problems and the overall management of an
individual's health care services." In turn, that statutory term, 'primary and preventative
health care,' assists in defining "medical home," under subsection (16), which itself is
addressed in LC. §31-3505F, which provides that "[t]he department [of Health and Welfare]
shall create by rule a community-based system in which a medically indigent patient may be
referred to a medical home upon discharge from hospital." and that "[a]ppropriate
reimbursement to the medical home provider for patient primary and preventive care services
employing utilization management and case management shall be coordinated by the
department" - none of which is at issue in this appeal.
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defined as "not medically necessary." Therefore, the Board's denial of the service dates of
October 11, 2017 through December 31, 2017 as 'not medically necessary' "because the patient
was clearly ready to transfer to subacute rehabilitation on October 10, 2017 ... " lacks grounding
in the governing statute, which includes no reference to "subacute" or "rehabilitation." AR 4.
Accordingly, the District Court's holding that "[t]he Legislature's decision not to include
'subacute rehabilitation' or 'rehabilitation' within that list is enough for the present analysis" is
determinative of this matter, as the only basis for the denial was that the "requested services
provided at St[.] Alphonsus Regional Medical Center form October 11, 2017 to December 31,
2017 are not medically necessary according to Idaho Medical Review LLC because the patient
was clearly ready to transfer to subacute rehabilitation on October 10, 2017 but had no

funding." AR 4 (emphasis added).
Importantly, the County's brief-in-chief does not dispute the District Court's
interpretation of LC. §31-3502(18) with respect to "rehabilitation" or "subacute rehabilitation."
Instead, the County attempts to redirect this Court to an October 19, 2017 entry in the Patient's
medical records, which references "skilled nursing" 6 :

6

LC. §31-3502(1 S)(B)(d), governing enumerated 'not medically necessary categories,' lists
"residential, skilled nursing, assisted living and/or shelter care facilities" as one category. These
are terms of art that have been specifically defined elsewhere. See, e.g., I.C. §39-3302(27)
("'Residential care or assisted living facility' means a facility or residence, however named,
operated on either a profit or nonprofit basis for the purpose of providing necessary supervision,
personal assistance, means and lodging to three (3) or more adults not related to the owner.").
Likewise, a "skilled nursing facility" is one where a patient requires "daily professional nursing
supervision" but where "[m]edical supervision is necessary on a regular, but not daily, basis."
IDAPA 16.03.02.002.33; see also 16.03.02.002.32 (defining "shelter home" and referencing
"shelter care" further within the rule).
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Rehabilitation. The patient does have some functional and mobility deficits that
will require continued rehabilitation efforts following discharge from the acute
hospital. Current rehabilitative recommendation is for the patient to undergo her
subacute rehabilitation at a community based skilled nursing facility. Currently
subacute rehabilitation unit at Saint Alphonsus is able to accommodate patients
who need a short stay (7-10 days) for their rehabilitation needs with the
anticipation of returning directly home. This patient, although she has shown
improvement, still has needs that would likely require longer than 7-10 days to
return to baseline. We will continue to provide daily bedside therapies including
physical therapy and occupational therapy and advance her bedside therapies as
the patient is able to tolerate.
AR 108. Indeed, the County's brief encourages upholding the Board's decision through the lens
of a "skilled nursing" analysis, based upon that note. See County Brief-in-Chief, p. 9. However,
this argument fails for two critical reasons: first, neither the Dammrose Report nor the Board's
denial make any reference to "skilled nursing" as a basis for denial, only "subacute
rehabilitation" (which, again, the District Court correctly noted is not mentioned in the statute);
second, as discussed in greater detail below, even had the Dammrose Report/Board denial been
predicated on a "skilled nursing" argument, no such services were actually available to the
patient, as plainly required by the statutory language. 7
Accordingly, as correctly decided by the District Court, the care provided from October
11 through December 31, 201 7 at Saint Alphonsus was, in fact, not excluded by the express
provisions of LC. §31-3502(18).

Thus, for this reason alone, the care provided by Saint

Alphonsus from October 11 through December 31, 2017 should be reimbursed by Idaho's

7

Most simply, the 'not medically necessary' care outlined in I.C. §3 l-3502(18)(B) refers to care
related to/provided in certain contexts: "Services related to, or provided by, residential, skilled
nursing, assisted living and/or shelter care facilities[.]'; it includes no language regarding
hypothetical or "could have been" scenarios, nor, of course, any reference to "rehabilitation."
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medical indigency statutes, and the District Court correctly reversed the final determination of
the County.
C.

The District Court Correctly Held that Only Those Services Actually Available to
the Patient are to be Considered When Determining Medical Necessity.
1. The District Court's statutory analysis and factual summary.
In reversing the Board's denial of the October 11 to December 31, 2017 dates of service

for the Patient, the District Court held that "necessary medical service" under Idaho Code §313502( 18) is directed to medical services actually available to the patient, both through its use of
the present-tense "are", as well as its use of the comparative "most":
Here, the Legislature drafted the definitions concerning "medically necessary
services" in the present tense-by repeated use of the verb "are." Nothing in the
statutory definition suggests that a county board should evaluate future services
that do not yet exist, or past treatments that are no longer used. . ..
The present tense suggests a connection to a moment in time, the time of
treatment, not to some future, past, or hypothetical time. The Legislature's use of
present tense language in drafting the statute directs the nature of the investigation
and determination of a county board who considers the applications for financial
support. That a service may have been available or will be available is not
suggested by the text of the statute. The service must be currently available ....
Inclusion of the word "most" within the phrase "most cost-effective" invites a
comparison of services available to the patient. The question is what is in the
bucket to be compared. It is meaningless and illusory to compare outcomes to the
patient of choices that are not available. Most cost-effective must mean an
evaluation of treatment options available to the patient at the time services are to
be rendered. Inclusion of the word "effective" within the phrase "most costeffective" invites a measure of the outcomes on the patient. Unavailable
treatments have no effectiveness. If a certain treatment option is unavailable to a
patient, that treatment option cannot Win the comparison to be the "most costeffective" treatment.
CR 105-107.

Correctly, the District Court noted that the record was devoid of any
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demonstratable alternative to the care that the Patient was provided by Saint Alphonsus:
The patient here could not be placed in a subacute rehabilitation facility largely
due to lack of insurance and funding. This is noted early in the medical records,
starting on October 17, 2017. Agency R. at 102. Thereafter, the patient's
physicians frequently note lack of funding as a barrier to placement in
rehabilitation. The medical records indicate that the patient "is not strong enough
to go home and does not have funding for discharge to an outpatient facility. [The
patient] remains in the hospital for ongoing therapies given the lack of a safe
discharge plan." Id. at 234, 237, 241. On December 12, 2017, the records state
that the patient "has no funding to discharge to an outpatient facility and has been
turned down by our inpatient rehabilitation, as her expected length of stay would
be too long." Id. at 244 (emphasis added). In an interim summary for the dates of
December 20-27, 2017, the medical notes indicate the patient's disposition as
"likely to remain in the hospital until ... strong enough to discharge home With
home health as we have no inpatient rehab options." Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
The records demonstrate that the patient's lack of funding was an
insurmountable barrier to a transfer to rehabilitation outside the hospital.
CR 102 (italics in original, bold emphasis added).
As discussed below, this is an accurate summary of the facts regarding Patient's care, and
a correct interpretation of the governing statute, such that the District Court's ruling should be
affirmed.
2. Statutory interpretation, generally.
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and this language
should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Seward v. Pac. Hide & Fur Depot, 138
Idaho 509, 511, 65 P.3d 531, 533 (2003) (quoting Jen-Rath Co. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330,
335, 48 P.3d 659, 664 (2002)). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, 'the clearly expressed
intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to
consider rules of statutory construction."' St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd., 146 Idaho at 755.
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A statute is ambiguous when:
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain or
disagree as to its meaning. However, ambiguity is not established merely because
different possible interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case then all
statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered ambiguous. . . [A] statute is
not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise more than on interpretation of
it.
Jayo Dev., Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 152, 345 P.3d 207, 211 (2015)

(quoting Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 318 P.3d 622 (2014)).
3. The statute's evaluation of "most cost-effective" services cannot include services that
do not exist.
The plain language ofldaho Code §31-3502(18) clearly requires that only those services
that are actually available to the Patient are to be considered when determining whether the
services rendered "[a]re the most cost-effective." In pertinent part, subsection 18(A)(e) requires
that necessary medical services "[a]re the most cost-effective service or sequence of services ... "
LC. §31-3502(18)(A)(e) (emphasis added). Thus, in order to be a "necessary medical service,"
the services being provided "are" to be the most cost-effective. The use of the affirmative verb
"are" clearly indicates that the services rendered to the patient must be actual, rather than
hypothetical or theoretical, services.

There is no suggestion from this verb choice that the

services to be considered are those that are merely potential, such as would be the case if, for
example, the statute employed the words "would be." By using the affirmative "are," the statute
plainly contemplates that the services to be considered are only those actually available to be
employed to produce the "therapeutic or diagnostic results for the person's illness, injury, or
disease." I.C. §3 l-3502(18)(A)( e). By its plain language, the statute requires that the necessary
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medical services "[a]re the most cost-effective service" available, not that some unavailable,
hypothetical medical services "[would be] the most cost-effective service."

Id. (emphasis

added).
Thus, LC. §31-3502(18) requires medical services be actually available when considering
whether care is a "necessary medical service." The statute does not state that alternative, lowercost care could be hypothetically available, nor does it state that a lower level of care facility be
merely potentially or hypothetically available to the patient. Further, if the statute regarding
"residential, skilled nursing, assisted living and/or shelter care facilities" applied to subacute
care, the statute only rejects that care if and when the care was actually provided at such
facilities, as noted above.

As such, even had the statute expressly included "subacute

rehabilitation" as a 'not medically necessary service' or otherwise intended for subacute care to
fall within the confines of the "residential, skilled nursing, assisted living, and/or shelter care
facilities," the services must still be actually available rather than an abstract hypothetical.
Here, the primary issue addressed at the hearing was with respect to the availability of a
facility willing to admit the Patient for the dates at issue and for the care needed - and, more
specifically, the lack of availability of such a facility due to funding, a point not disputed by the
County or Dr. Dammrose. The potential availability of a hypothetical facility willing and able to
provide lower level care is immaterial under the Medical Indigency Act; despite this, the Board
denied the dates at issue despite expressly finding the patient lacked resources for such
alternative care:
It also appears that requested services provided at St. Alphonsus Regional
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Medical Center from October 11, 201 7 to December 31, 201 7 are not medically
necessary according to the Idaho Medical Review, LLC because the patient was
clearly ready for transfer to subacute rehabilitation on October 10, 2017 but had
no funding. The remainder of the acute inpatient stay through December 31, 201 7
is considered not medically necessary for purposes of payment; therefore, the
patient is not medically indigent for said services.
AR 4 (emphasis added).
The plain language of Idaho Code §31-3502(18) establishes that the denied dates of
service were compensable necessary medical services and the Board acted in violation of
statutory provisions and exceeded its statutory authority by denying compensation for those
dates. As the medical records reflect, the Patient could not be discharged home, and lacked
funding for an alternative community-based facility. While other (unidentified and hypothetical)
facilities "[ could be] more cost-effective," those facilities were not available to the Patient, as she
had no funding (a finding expressly made by the Board).

The Patient required necessary

inpatient services from October 11 through December 31, 201 7, and Saint Alphonsus was the
only facility that would provide those services, and therefore, they were "the most cost-effective

service[s]." See St. Joseph Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cnty. Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 486, 490, 5
P.3d 466, 470 (2000).
Accordingly, the Board was required to approve those dates of service for
reimbursement. LC. §31-3503(1) ("The county commissioners ... shall .. .pay for necessary
medical services of the medically indigent[.]") Twin Falls Cnty. v. Idaho Comm'n on
Redistricting. 152 Idaho 346, 349, 271 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2012) ("The words 'must' and 'shall'
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are mandatory[.]"). By denying payment for the dates of service at issue, the Board violated the
provisions of the Medical Indigency Act and thereby exceeded its statutory authority.
4. The Board has not, and cannot, identify any alternative service providers.
In the County's brief-in-chief, the County continues to assert that the dates of service at
issue "could have been provided at a lower cost in a subacute setting" (County's Brief-In-Chief,
p. 7), but still fails to identify any viable alternative service providers.
First, the County apparently levels criticism at St. Alphonsus for not taking the Patient inhouse, arguing "the existence of inpatient rehab services at St. Alphonsus that we can readily
assume cost less than the rate for full, acute care hospital services that were provided to the
Patient." (County's Brief-in-Chief, p. 7.) 8 For that reason, the County argues that it "is not
obligated to provide compensation to the applicant hospital when its own rehab unit's policies
stand in the way of transferring the Patient to a lower cost level of care." (Id. at 8.) 9
What the County demands here would have been for Saint Alphonsus to violate its own
policies simply to assist the County in avoiding reimbursement for care provided to the
medically indigent Patient. At the time of the key October 19, 2017, Progress Note, the Patient's
treaters recognized the inability to transfer the Patient to short-term, pre-release inpatient
rehabilitation care in the hospital precisely the care needed was long-term care:
8

The County cites nothing in the record in support of such an assumption.

9

As an aside, in referring to "lower cost of care," the Court is reminded that the County made no
inquiry as to what that "lower cost of care" would have been, nor made any other effort to pay at
a lower rate. Instead, the County simply wants to harriedly characterize the Patient's care as
"rehabilitation" or "subacute" (which, again, are not excluded categories under LC. §313502(18)) to instead completely deny all reimbursement for such services.
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Rehabilitation. The patient does have some functional and mobility deficits that
will require continued rehabilitation efforts following discharge from the acute
hospital. Current rehabilitative recommendation is for the patient to undergo her
subacute rehabilitation at a community based skilled nursing facility. Currently
subacute rehabilitation unit at Saint Alphonsus is able to accommodate
patients who need a short stay (7-10 days) for their rehabilitation needs with
the anticipation of returning directly home. This patient, although she has
shown improvement, still has needs that would likely require longer than 710 days to return to baseline. We will continue to provide daily bedside
therapies including physical therapy and occupational therapy and advance her
bedside therapies as the patient is able to tolerate.
AR 108 (emphasis added). Indeed, in this particular case, the County cannot even second-guess
this conclusion by the Patient's medical providers at that time, because the record reflects that
the Patient indeed required ongoing treatment at Saint Alphonsus for almost 3 more months, to
January 12, 2018. AR 336-350; accord, AR 24 (Dammrose Report: "She was considered a
potential candidate for inpatient rehabilitation on 10/19, but had no funding for it, and St.
Alphonsus subacute rehabilitation refused her due to a probable long stay.")( emphasis
added).
Perhaps more importantly, this argument again attempts to reframe the denial by the
County and the Dammrose Report opinion - the Patient's dates of services were not denied
because she could not be treated in-house due to Saint Alphonsus policies, but because she
lacked funding to be transferred to another 'subacute rehabilitation' facility. See AR 4 (Initial
Denial: "It also appears that requested services provided at St[.] Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center form October 11, 2017 to December 31, 2017 are not medically necessary according to
Idaho Medical Review LLC because the patient was clearly ready to transfer to subacute
rehabilitation on October 10, 2017 but had no funding.")(emphasis added) & AR 25

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE BRIEF - 22

(Dammrose Report: "The patient was clearly ready for a transfer to subacute rehabilitation on
10/10 but had no funding.")(emphasis added).
The County also invites this Court to take 'judicial notice' not only of (unidentified) local
rehabilitation facilities that would have taken the Patient, but even what the cost of such care
might have been, as the record plainly does not contain such information:
The Court may take judicial notice of the many rehabilitation facilities in the
community, any of which existed where the Patient could have been rendered the
care she needed, as repeatedly outlined by the treating physicians beginning on
October 10, 2017. Even though no comparative billing from a rehab facility is
contained in the record, it is safe to assume that subacute care is less costly than
acute care.
(County Brief-in-Chief, p. 12.) In short, the County asks this Court to carry its water in rebutting
the (undisputed) evidence presented by Saint Alphonsus, that the Patient lacked funding to be
transferred to some hypothetical 'subacute rehabilitation' facility. The Court should reject such
invitation; once Saint Alphonsus presented the Board with its evidence that the Patient was
unable to be placed anywhere, the burden shifted to the County to rebut that evidence - in
particular, by identifying facility/ies that would have accepted the Patient without funding. 10 The

10

Similarly, in a Memorandum Decision and Order issued in St. Luke's Regional Med. Ctr, Ltd.,
v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Ada Cnty., (Ada Co. Case No. CV-OC-2014-17922, filed May 8, 2015,
and attached hereto as Appendix A), the District Court found that despite the Board's
determination that the Patient had multiple jobs he could apply for, those jobs were not actually
available to him. As such, the Court found that Ada County's attribution of full-time work to the
Patient's involuntary unemployed individual was not supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. Accord, generally, St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm'rs of Gooding Cty., 149 Idaho 584, 592, 237 P.3d 120, 1212 (2010)("Another thing
that the courts generally figure into the equation in making lost income calculations is the
availability of jobs in the local market. If a person can't get a job, even if able to perform certain
work, imputation of income may not be reasonable. In looking at the County Board's Amended
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Board - and Dr. Dammrose - failed to do so. Indeed, the record is undisputed that Saint
Alphonsus provided necessary medical services to the Patient through January 2018.

The

County has provided no contrary evidence suggesting that the Patient was able to be transferred
to an available location as of October 11, 2017. The services provided to the Patient during the
dates in question were provided by Saint Alphonsus because the Patient was not strong enough
to go home and did not have funding for discharge to an outpatient facility. AR 257.

She

remained at Saint Alphonsus for ongoing treatments due to the lack of a viable discharge plan.
See, e.g., AR 87, 91, 94, 102, 105, 108, 124, 130, 165, 249, 257, and 302. Accordingly, as
Findings of Fact and Decision on Remand, the Board states that 'Megan Freeman is capable of
working in a full-time minimum wage job,' but does not indicate whether or not such a job is
available in the locality. Perhaps it was assumed at the time that she would have no difficulty in
finding a job. However, with the current economic climate and scarcity of jobs, the chances of
obtaining employment and income, imputed or otherwise, appears to be rather slim. If no job is
available to the applicant, it hardly seems appropriate to impute any income.")(J. J. Jones,
concurring.) A similar result was reached in a Kootenai County District Court decision rejecting
the imputation of income to part-time worker, holding that the burden fell on the County to prove
its claimed mitigation of the amount it owed under the application - something the court held it
had not done:
This is precisely what the BOCC has done in the instant case, provide a "mere
suggestion that a means of mitigation exists." Id. In this case, it was not even a
"mere suggestion"; the entire issue of S.B. being able to perform a full time job at
Qualfon was made up out of whole cloth by the BOCC. The only "evidence" was
a job advertisement; there was no proof, no evidence that an opening even existed
at Qualfon at the time of the hearing. No one from Qualfon testified on that point.
No one testified what the physical, mental, and emotional requirements of any job
at Qualfon were. No one testified what accommodations Qualfon could make for
a person's physical or emotional limitations. No one from Qualfon testified
whether a person with essentially no computer skills could perform the job.
In the Matter of the Request for Indigency Medical Assisance [sic] for S.B., Kootenai County
Case No. CV28-19-1247, Memorandum Decision and Order, July 31, 2019, at pp. 21-22
(attached as Appendix B).
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undisputed in the facts in the record, Saint Alphonsus rendered services that were the only
actually available and, therefore, the most cost effective.
The failure of the County and Dr. Dammrose to identify any specific alterative provider
that would have accepted the unfunded Patient to provide 'subacute rehabilitation' care for
almost 3 months renders both the Board's decision - and the opinion of Dr. Dammrose unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. As undisputed in the facts in the record,
Saint Alphonsus rendered services that were the only actually available and, therefore, the most
cost effective. As such, the dates of service of October 11 through December 31, 201 7 were
medically necessary, and Saint Alphonsus should be reimbursed for such dates of care.
As such, the Board's denial was appropriately reversed by the District Court.
5. Evaluation of the intent of Idaho's medical indigency statutes favors Saint Alphonsus,
not the County.
The County further argues that the intent of Idaho's medical indigency statutes support
the County's position. (County's Brief-in-Chief, p. 11: "The intent of the legislature is for a
county to pay only for necessary medical services provided to an indigent patient."). However,
the evaluation of the Legislature's intent plainly favors Saint Alphonsus in this matter.
"[T]he legislature's intent in enacting the medical indigency assistance statutes was twofold: to provide indigents with access to medical care and to allow hospitals to obtain
compensation for services rendered to indigents." Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho
808, 810, 53 P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) (quoting Carpenter v. Twin Falls Cnty., 107 Idaho 575, 691
P.2d 1190 (1984)). Here, the County's interpretation of the requirements of LC. §31-3502(18)
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directly conflicts with those purposes. Citing to unidentified, hypothetical services, rather than
actually available services, to determine that care is not compensable undermines the intent of
the Medical Indigency Act. Allowing counties to deny reimbursement on such a ground would
result in providers being faced with the choice of either: ( 1) discharging a patient home before
the patient is clinically approved for discharge, or (2) continuing to treat an indigent patient
without any potential for compensation. In either scenario, one of the purposes of the Medical
Indigency Act is frustrated. Either the indigent patient is denied access to medical care by being
discharged to home before they are clinically approved; or, the provider is deprived of its right to
compensation for medical services rendered to an indigent patient. Neither option comports with
the intent of the statutes. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cty., 159 Idaho
84, 86, 356 P.3d 377, 379 (2015) ("Consequently, Idaho's Medical Indigency Act requires
counties to contribute to the cost of providing necessary medical care to county residents who are
indigent. This Court has stated that placing too heavy a burden on providers to collect on
services rendered to medical indigents could reduce hospitals' ability to provide such
services.")(emphasis added).

Accordingly, interpreting Idaho Code §31-3502(18) to allow the County to deny payment
based on hypothetical, rather than actually available services, is inconsistent with the Medical
Indigency Act's purpose.
D.

The District Court Correctly Relied Upon the St. Joseph Decision.

In reversing the Board's decision, the District Court identified St. Joseph Reg'l Med. Ctr.
v. Nez Perce Cnty. Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 486, 5 P.3d 466 (2000)("St. Joseph") as guiding
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authority, holding that "[t]his Court follows the holding of St. Joseph Regional Medical Center
here. Only services actually available to a patient are considered for purposes of what services
are most cost-effective."

(CR 108.)

On appeal to this Court, the County disputes the

applicability of St. Joseph, arguing that "St. Joseph's does not authorize the insertion of
availability based on financial resources into the determination of medical necessity," also
referencing a District Court-level decision from Gem County involving St. Luke's which is also
currently pending appeal before this Court.11 To the contrary, the St. Joseph decision plainly
supports the District Court's decision.
In St. Joseph, the county denied an application because it found the patient could have
received care at lower cost facilities rather than at an acute psychiatric hospital where the
treatment actually took place.

Relying on the affidavit testimony of a state mental health

program manager to that effect, the county determined that because the services the patient had
received at the acute psychiatric hospital were "available to" the patient "from state, federal and
local health programs," the services rendered at the hospital were not "necessary medical
services" and therefore denied payment. Id. at 489-90.
On judicial review, the District Court "dismantled the Board's finding that other
resources were available to [the patient]" and determined that "none of the documentation upon
which the Board based its decision provided any details as to whether specific services were
actually available to [the patient]." Id. at 489-90. As the only evidence in the record was that the

11

St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. vs. Board of Commissioners of Gem County, Idaho, Supreme
Court Docket No. 47872-2020, Gem County No. CV-2017-145.
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facilities identified by the county as "available" to take the patient were not actually available to
take the patient, the evidence did not support the county's denial. Id. (emphasis added). The
Court noted "only those resources actually available to an applicant can be considered for
purposes of eligibility for medical indigency benefits," and reversed the Board's denial for
compensation of services. Id.
Here, as discussed at length above, the Board denied the dates of service from October 11
through December 31, 2017. AR 24. As in St. Joseph, no other facilities were actually available
to the Patient during the time period at issue due to lack of funding (nor was the patient
appropriate for release to home). See, e.g., AR 105, 124, 165, and 302. Additionally, neither Dr.
Dammrose nor the County otherwise asserted the actual availability of any specific different
facility willing to provide a lower level of care to a patient with no funding. AR 4-5 & 24-25.
As such, the Board's decision to deny service for the dates at issue was not supported by
evidence in the record. The care provided by Saint Alphonsus, but denied by the County, was
actually the most-cost effective service because it is was the only service actually available to the
Patient. St. Joseph, supra, at 489-90.
The County also points to the St. Luke's/Gem County District Court decision, 12 which
contended that the determination in St. Joseph did not hinge on the financial ability of patient to

12

Saint Alphonsus does not undertake an exhaustive analysis of the Gem County decision and
the underlying County decision, and otherwise defers to those arguments made by St. Luke's in
its own pending appeal to this Court. See Appellant's Opening Brief, filed August 5, 2020, St.
Luke's Health System, Ltd. vs. Board of Commissioners of Gem County, Idaho, Supreme Court
Docket No. 47872-2020, Gem County No. CV-2017-145. Further, when the decision of the
Gem County District Court was issued, it was already aware of the District Court decision in this
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secure alternative care. County's Brief-in-Chief at 10 ("St. Joseph's does not authorize the
insertion of availability based on financial resources into the determination of medical
necessity."). In fact, the St. Joseph court did emphasize the patient's financial limitations with
respect to trying to secure alternative care for the patient:
The Board also denied B.T. medical indigency status based upon a finding that
there were other resources available to provide the same services to B.T., such as
state-supported mental health services, through Idaho Mental Health and the state
psychiatric hospitals, and alcohol treatment through the Port of Hope and Roger's
Counseling Center. The Board relied on an affidavit and supporting
documentation from the program manager for Region II Mental Health Services,
which is a program provided by the State of Idaho, Department of Health
and Welfare, Division of Family and Community Services. Under LC. § 313502(1 S)(B)(g), "services ... available to an applicant from state, federal and local
health programs" are not includable as "necessary medical services" for which the
indigency statutes provide payment.
The record reflects that on the first day of service, B. T. was homeless,
without income and with access to only one week of resources. Within a day of
her admission, B.T. was interviewed by a representative of Idaho Mental Health
for referral to a voluntary bed at State Hospital North. However, on July 8, 1996,
Idaho Mental Health advised SJRMC that "Pathgrant Funds ha[d] been
exhausted until September 1996 and that patient c[ould] follow up with
Idaho Mental Health and Chemical Dependency program of choice." On July
9, 1996, another entry in B.T.'s hospital record indicates "Idaho Mental Health
has refused to see patient due to diagnosis being drug and alcohol related."
Recognizing a discharge plan problem in B.T.'s case, SJRMC continued to
look into housing assistance on her behalf, other available services, and
treatment referrals. When follow-up treatment was arranged through Roger's
Counseling Center in Clarkston, Washington, B.T. was discharged from SJRMC.
The district court in its opinion on review dismantled the Board's finding that
other resources were available to B.T. The district court determined that none of
the documentation upon which the Board based its decision provided any details
matter; rather than any substantive analysis of this case and the Ada County District Court's
analysis, the Gem County District Court simply noted, "With due respect to my able colleague, I
disagree with his analysis." County's Brief-in-Chief, Appendix A, p. 11, n.2.
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as to whether specific services were actually available to B.T. The district court
further commented that the Regional Mental Health Services Act, LC. § 39-3101
et seq., could not be used as a vehicle for determining the availability of services;
that the Alcohol Treatment Act, LC. § 39-300 et seq., did not address needs
related to the psychosis for which B. T. was treated; and that there was no
evidence in the record indicating that either the Port of Hope or Roger's
Counseling Center provided short-term treatment for psychosis.
St. Joseph, 134 Idaho at 489-90 (emphases added).
The County also quotes the Gem County District Court decision in noting that "if ability
to pay is a consideration in the availability of alternate providers, that aspect will, in most cases,
swallow consideration of every other element that is supposed to be measured and the actual
issue of which is the most cost-effective service will disappear." County's Brief-in-Chief at 1011. Rightfully so, per the intent of Idaho's medical indigency statutes! A patient should not be
denied care because of some unidentified, hypothetical service that cannot actually be accessed,
and a hospital should not be forced to absorb the cost of providing care to indigent county
residents based on reference to some phantom unavailable care that could be cheaper; to hold
otherwise runs directly contrary to the intent of the statutes. Moreover, the lack of availability of
an alternative service provider should "swallow consideration of every other element" m
analyzing the "most cost-effective service" - because there would be nothing to compare. 13
Accordingly, the District Court correctly relied upon St. Joseph in reversing the Board's
decision to deny the October 11 to December 31, 201 7 dates of service.

13

Of course, even where a patient has funding, alternative services may still not be available,
based upon, for example, bed availability, scope of services, refusal to accept the patient, etc.
But, where a patient lacks funding in the first instance, evaluation of those other considerations is
rendered unnecessary.
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E. The County Cannot Contend that October 10 is the Correct Cutoff Date.
As noted above, the Board approved reimbursement for care provided from October 7
through October 10, 2017, but otherwise denied dates of care from October 11 through
December 31, 2017. AR 6-7. Poorly explained, however, was the basis for using October 10,
201 7 as the cutoff date for the approved dates. On appeal to the District Court, Ada County
acknowledged that the factual basis for such date was unclear; however, Ada County now
apparently attempts to offer new argument to justify that date, which efforts should be rejected
by this Court.
As explained above, the record did not support the Board's (and Dr. Dammrose's)
conclusion that that October 10, 2017 was the cutoff date, when records reflect that the Patient
did not even become a potential candidate for transfer to rehabilitation until October 19, 2017.
See AR 105 (10/19 progress note: "Because she does not have funding, rehab is not an option

unless she is accepted by our own rehabilitation here.") 14, AR 72-74 (10/10 Progress Note; no
reference to rehabilitation), and AR 24 (Dammrose Report: "She was considered a potential
candidate for inpatient rehabilitation on 10/19, but had no funding for it, and St. Alphonsus
subacute rehabilitation refused her due to a probable long stay."); compare with AR 4 (Initial
Denial: "It also appears that requested services provided at St[.] Alphonsus Regional Medical
14

Discussions with Patient regarding the potential for rehabilitation appear to have begun on or
around October 13. AR 87 ("Inpatient for now, and I started discussions with the patient about
possible rehabilitation, patient has no funding, we'll place BPM&R."); see also AR 91 (10/14
Progress Note: "Inpatient for now, await neuropsych eval, also await response from BPM&R on
whether they might take her in rehab"), AR 94 (10/15 Progress Note, same), & AR 105 (10/19
Progress Note: "Because she does not have funding, rehab is not an option unless she is accepted
by our own rehabilitation team.").
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Center form October 11, 2017 to December 31, 2017 are not medically necessary according to
Idaho Medical Review LLC because the patient was clearly ready to transfer to subacute

rehabilitation on October 10, 2017 but had no funding.")(emphasis added) and AR 25
(Dammrose Report: "The patient was clearly ready for a transfer to subacute rehabilitation on
10/10 but had no funding.")(emphasis added).
This deficiency and error in the Dammrose Report and Initial Denial was raised at
hearing on October 17, 2018. (Agency Tr., Oct. 17, 2018, at 11. 6:16-23: "B. Nickels: One thing
I think is problematic with Doctor Dammrose's report, he identifies October Tenth as the cutoff
date ... um ... he doesn't site any particular medical record or any physician opinion for that
basis. His report actually refers to the patient being appropriate for referal [sic] to rehabilitation
on October Nineteenth, which is what I think the records more closely reflect. So, I don't know
how he came up with that October Tenth date.

So, I think for that reason, his report is

erroneous."). No response was offered by the County at that hearing, nor at the later resumed
March 27, 2019 hearing. See generally Agency Tr., October 17, 2018 & March 27, 2019.
On appeal to the District Court, St. Alphonsus again noted this error by Dr. Dammrose in
its briefing. CR 55 & 62 (St. Alphonsus' brief-in-chief), and 81 (St. Alphonsus' reply brief).
Ada County effectively conceded the error, noting:
Looking to the Progress notes of Jacob B. Jones, D.O. dated October 10, 2017, the
Assessment and Plan indicated, "The patient is stable to transfer to the medical
floor without telemetry." A.R. p. 74 There is no discussion of subacute
rehabilitation, and it is unclear as to how the Ada County Medical Adviser
fixed October 11, 2017 as the first date of not necessary services.
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As early as October 13, 2017, or at least as of October 19, 2017, the Patient was
not provided "the most cost-effective service" that was "at least as likely to
produce equivalent therapeutic or diagnostic results" for the Patient. These
services meet the definition of not necessary services under Idaho Code § 313502( 18)A(e).
(CR 76 (County's District Court Response Brief))(emphasis added). 15 At argument before the
District Court, the County even advocated for a remand to clarify the date, acknowledging that
the basis for the cutoff between approved and unapproved dates of care was unclear:
17 Now, there was some discussion about a
18 remand. It might be appropriate to have the board
19 clarify the date, the beginning date of the period
20 where the services were deemed not medically
21 necessary. Because it's very unclear to me even
22 why Dr. Damrose [sic] came up with the date of
23 October 11th as the first date. But in terms of
24 finding that these services are medically
25 necessary, I would argue to the Court that they
1 should be deemed not medically necessary as found
2 by the board.
3 THE COURT: Thank you.
4 MS. TARDIFF: Thank you.
5 THE COURT: Ms. Tardiff, to follow that
6 last point, what do I do with that? Do I remand,
7 have the board make additional finding, and then
8 bring it right back to me on similar issues?
9 What's your proposal?
10 MS. TARDIFF: To uphold the finding of
11 not medically necessary, but to remand to the
12 board for a clarification of the start date of the
13 period of nonpayment. So it might lead to payment
15

Ada County pointed to the October 13 date based upon a physician's progress note that
indicated that the patient was "[i]npatient for now, and I started discussions with the patient
about possible rehabilitation, patient has no funding, we'll place BPM&R." (CR 75 & AR 87.)
However, both the Board's Initial Denial and the Dammrose Report are devoid of any discussion
of this October 13 entry, and, as such, that date does not form any basis for the Board's
determination or the opinions in the Dammrose Report.
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14 of some additional days for the hospital. But it
15 doesn't have to come back to the Court, your
16 Honor. There would just be new findings made at
17 the board level, and that would be a finding of
18 fact.
(Court Tr., 11/12/19 Hearing, at 11. 20:17-21:18.) Ultimately, Saint Alphonsus prevailed before
the District Court, which held that all of the dates denied by the Board were incorrectly denied,
so discussion of this smaller subset of dates was unnecessary. However, the Court noted that,
while ultimately not dispositive, the Board had acknowledged the lack of clarity surrounding the
date they themselves had selected:
St. Alphonsus argues that Dr. Dammrose's opinion was erroneous and that it is
"unclear from the report as to how Dr. Dammrose came to the determination that
October 10, 2017 was the cutoff date, when the records reflect that the Patient did
not become a potential candidate for transfer until October 19, 2017." Pet'r Br. at
5. The Board acknowledges that "it is unclear as to how the Ada County
Medical Advisor fixed October 11, 2017 as the first date of not necessary
medical services." Resp 't Br. at 7. The medical records in the agency record do
not demonstrate that a transfer occurred during the patient's treatment at St.
Alphonsus, only that the patient was eligible for one. While there might be an
incorrect fact in Dr. Dammrose's report regarding the date of transfer, the error is
not dispositive here. The agency record does not demonstrate a lack of
investigation on the part of Board in this case. A remand is not necessary for
further investigation into the facts of the case, nor is one required by section 675279(3 ). Remand is only necessary to implement this ruling.
CR 110-111 (emphasis added).
However, in the briefing currently before this Court, it appears that Ada County is now
attempting to provide a post hoc justification for the selection of October 11, 201 7, pointing to
references in the medical records to telemetry monitoring and supportive care (but not "transfer
to subacute rehabilitation," the basis for the Board's denial of the October 11-December 31, 2017
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dates of care, see AR 4.) See County's Brief-in-Chief at 1. The County's analysis even includes
citation

to

online

reference

sources

"drugs.com"

and

"medical-

dictionary.thefreedictionary.com," none of which have been cited or argued previously by the
County, and make no appearance in either the Board's denial or in the Dammrose report. Id.
Bluntly, any contention now by Ada County that the October 11 date identified in the
Board's denial and the Dammrose Report is supported by the record is, as outlined above, in
direct contradiction to concessions already made by the County before the District Court. See,
e.g., Brief-in-Chief at 12 ("As the Medical Advisor's opinion informed the Board, the services

needed by this Patient after October 10, 2017 were not required to be provided at St. Alphonsus
in the acute care setting."). Further, attempts to reference materials outside the record - never
presented by the County to either the Board or the District Court - should be disregarded by this
Court.

See, e.g., Nelson v. Franklin Grp., Inc., 166 Idaho 702, 462 P.3d 1166, 1169

(2020)("Because our review is 'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were
presented ... below,' this Court cannot consider a new issue for the first time on appeal."); Beale
v. State, Dep't of Labor, 139 Idaho 356, 359, 79 P.3d 715, 718 (2003)("The Beales also argue
that the Department charged excessive penalties and interest on the amount that they owe. They
contend that the district court erred in holding that the correct amount they owed was $4,150.00.
That issue was never presented to or decided by the district court. Therefore, we do not address
it.").
Accordingly, this Court should disregard any attempt by the County to introduce new
arguments into this matter which have not previously been pursued and are not otherwise based
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on the record. Instead, this Court should correctly find that the Board's decision to use October
11, 201 7 as the first date of not necessary medical services was not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
However, as otherwise discussed above, this plain error by the Board is only a component
of a larger error, in determining that any of the denied dates were 'not medically necessary.'
While the Board erroneously used October 11, 2017 as the first date of 'not necessary medical
services' rather than October 19, 2017, this Court should otherwise affirm the District Court's
decision in finding that the Board should have approved reimbursement to the hospital for the
entire block of denied dates - October 11 through December 31, 2017.
F.

The County Has Not Contested that Saint Alphonsus' Substantial Rights Have Been
Violated.
As above, the Medical Indigency Act grants hospital providers the right to compensation

for providing necessary medical care to indigent patients. Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143
Idaho at 810 ("'[T]he legislature's intent in enacting the medical indigency assistance statute was
two-fold: to provide indigents with access to medical care and to allow hospitals to obtain
compensation or services rendered to indigents."'); St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr.,
Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Gooding Cnty., 150 Idaho 484, 488, 248 P.3d 735, 739 (2011)
("[T]he Medical Indigency Act was meant to ensure that hospitals obtain actual compensation
for the care provided to indigent patients.") A substantial right must be prejudiced to overturn a
Board's decision to deny provider compensation. Id.
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Here, the Patient was undisputedly indigent, a resident of Idaho, and Ada County was the
obligated County. AR 4 & 6. By denying compensation for the dates of October 11, 2017
through December 31, 201 7, even when the evidence showed that the Patient could not be safely
discharged home or otherwise placed in an alternative community-based facility, the Board
violated Saint Alphonsus' statutory right to compensation for providing necessary medical
services to an indigent patient. By depriving Saint Alphonsus of such right, Saint Alphonsus'
substantial rights have been prejudiced.
On appeal to the District Court, Ada County did not advance any substantive argument in
briefing or at hearing that, even if the Board were found to have erred, Saint Alphonsus did not
have its substantial rights prejudiced. See generally CR 67-77 (only briefly noted in the Standard
of Review at CR 72) and Court Tr., 11/12/19 Hearing. In ruling in Saint Alphonsus' favor, the
District Court expressly held that the Board's error resulted in prejudice to Saint Alphonsus'
substantial rights. CR 109 ("St. Alphonsus' s substantial rights to compensation for providing
medical services to an indigent patient were violated by the Board's denial of reimbursement.")
Likewise, in the County's brief-in-chief to this Court, the County does not contend that,
even if the Board is found to have erred, Saint Alphonsus did not have its substantial rights
prejudiced. See generally County Brief-in-Chief. Accordingly, for this reason, if this Court
finds that the Board erred in denying the dates of service at issue, it should also find that such
error violated Saint Alphonsus' substantial rights, as the County has not contested that point.
G.

Ada County is not entitled to fees and costs on appeal.
Ada County also requests an award of fees under Idaho Code § 12-11 7, asserting only that
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"St. Alphonsus is defending this appeal without a basis in fact or law." (County's Brief-in-Chief
at 13.)
As noted above, Saint Alphonsus prevailed on this appeal before the District Court. (CR
95-111.) This alone amply demonstrates that Saint Alphonsus' defense of Ada County's appeal
has "adequate legal foundation." See, e.g., Hardy v. Phelps, 165 Idaho 137, 147, 443 P.3d 151,
161 (2019).

This, coupled with Saint Alphonsus' arguments set forth above as to why the

District Court's decision should be affirmed, illustrate that there is plainly a "reasonable
controversy" - one that the District Court already correctly decided in Saint Alphonsus' favor.
See, e.g., Central Paving Co. v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 126 Idaho 174, 178, 879 P.2d 1107, 1111

(1994).
In any event, Ada County's request for fees and costs asserts only that "St. Alphonsus is
defending this appeal without basis in fact or law," with no specific argument or citation to
authority. This is insufficient to support an award of fees. See Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148
Idaho 261, 270, 220 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2009)("[I]n order to be entitled to attorney fees on appeal,
authority and argument establishing a right to fees must be presented in the first brief filed by a
party with this Court. A citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, 1s
insufficient.")(intemal citations omitted).
Accordingly, even were the District Court decision to be reversed by this Court, Ada
County should not be awarded fees and costs under I.C. §12-117.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Saint Alphonsus requests that this Court affirm the District
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Court's decision, which reversed the Ada County Board's denial of the October 11 through
December 31, 201 7 dates of service provided by Saint Alphonsus to the Patient.
DATED September 18, 2020.
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MOFFATI THOMAS, BAARETI,.
ROCK& FIELDS, CHTD.c;HRISTOPHER D.
By INGA JQbn\t_~:l;>(hl.-.-□ EP

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .ITJDICIAL DISTRIC

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD

3

4

ST LUKE'S REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, LTD.,

5

7

vs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: PETITION FOR nJDICIAL
REVIEW

8

9
10
--~----·--;_- -1

Case No. CV-OC-2014-J 7922

Petitioner,

6

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ADA
COUNTY, IDAHO, in th~ir official
capacity as the Board of County
···-commis-sioiiers for llie Cotiiltfof A:d~·s1:ate- --· of Idaho,

12

Respondent.
13
14

15

Before the Court is Petitioner's appeal of the Board of County Commissioners of Ada

County's ("Ada County") detetm.ination that a patient was not medically indigent pursuant to

16

Idaho Code Section 31-3501, et seq. As discussed below, the Court concludes that Ada
1J -

County's finding that the patient did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he
18
19
20

was medically indigent is not supported by substantial evidence on record as a whole.

Background and Prior Proceedings

21

('~the patient") received medical treatment from St. Luke's.

22

Regional Medical Center, Ltd. ("St. Luke's") in Boise from April, 23, 2013 to October 22,

23
24

25
26

M:EMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE 1

REDACTED

201_3 for a myocardial infarction. Agency Record ("R") at 1. At the time, the patient was a
1

resident of Boise. Id. St. Luke's provided $58,243.54 in medical services to the patient. Id.

2

On May 17, 2013, St. Luke's submitted an application to Canyon County for

3

4

assistance pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 31-3501 et seq: R. at 14, 32. Canyon County denied the

5

petition because it was not the obligated county. R. at 287. St. Luke's submitted, on behalf of

6

the patient, the same application for medical indigency assistance to Ada County.

7

R at 14,

30. On November 25, 2013, Ada County denied the application for ~h_e reason that it was

8

untimely filed in Canyon County. R. at 12. In the denial, Ada County made the following
9

statement:

10

ICappears-thaf llie-Patienfli,is- mef the requirements ·of Idaho- raw regarding•
residency, obligated county, medical necessity· and medical indigency.
Howeyer, it appears that all of the requested services were untimely filed.

11

12

Id. On December 20, 2013, St. Luke's appealed Ada County's initial denial. R. at 286.

13

14
1s

An agency hearing was held on the appeal on January 15, 2014. R. at 3; Ada County

Ii
:

took the matter under advisement and on February 12, 2014, Ada County issued Findings of

1

16

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Determination. R. at 1 -12. Ada County found that the
17

patient "previously worked as an ASE certified mechanic with 35 years of experience" and "is
18

capable of working as

19

an auto/shop technician."

R. at 7. At the hearing, the patient testified

20

he had been diligently seeking for employment, including jobs as an auto mechanic, at auto

21

parts stores such as Napa Auto Parts and Car Qwes~ as well as non-automotive jobs such as

22

Idaho Pizza Company, Pizza Hut and Gem State Paper. Hearing Transcript ("Tr.") at 11-13.

23· ·

The patient provided a list of some 3 5 employers from whom the patient sought employment

24
25
26
I
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from November 2013, when his last employment ended and the time of the hearing. R. at 276.
1
2
3

The patient testified he had received interviews with three employers, but po job offers. Tr-. at
12-13.
Ada County further found, based upon a deputy clerk's search of the Idaho Department

4

5

of Labor Job Service web site, "there were three jobs available as an auto/shop technician

6

eammg an average of$13.67 per hour." 1 R. at 7. Based upon that attributed hourly wage and

7

the patient's wife'-s gross income, Ada County found the patienfs resources totaled
8

$240,594.54 over a five-year period. R. at 8. Ada County thei::efore made the following
9

10

Conclusions of Law:

-- I.--Tlie -Patienre-staolfshecroy--aJireponderance·of the- evidence thax---- -- ·-- --- ·_ ·-- - - --·

11

- a s a resident of the State of Idaho at the time the
application was filed.

12
13

2. .The Patient established by a preponderance of the evidence that Ada
County is the obligated county.

14

3 .- The Patie1=1t established by a preponderance of the evidence that the medical
services were medically necessary.

15
16

4. The Patient e~tablished by a preponderance of the evidence that the
2
application was timely filed for services listed in Table c~

17
18

5. The Patient did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
is medically indigent.

19
20

R. at 9.

21
22
23

24

1

The base minimum salaries for the three attributed jobs were: $18.00/hour, $11.00/hour, and $12.00/hour. R. at
292 - 295. Ada County averaged the three salaries for an average of $13 .67 -per hour.
2
Table C is the list of timely filed emergent and non-emergent medical services. R. at 6.

25
26
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On September 19, 2014, St. Luke's filed a timely petition for judicial review of Ada
1

County's denial. The Court held a hearing into the matter on March 13, 2015. Mark C.

2
.

3

Peterson, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd., appeared and argued for the
Petitioner, St. Luke's. Claire S. Tardiff, Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, appeared

5

and argued for Ada County. At the hearing, Ada County conceded that the patient was

6

involuntarily unemployed.

7

The Court took the matter under advisement.
8

Standard of Review
9

An applicant denied medical "indigency status by the Board of County Commissioners

10

12

manner as provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for judicial review of actions." I.C. §

13

31-1506. As such,

14

[j]udicial review of [the Board's] order is limited to the record. A reviewing
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the [Board] on questions of
fact, and will uphold [the Board's] finding of fact if supported by substantial
and competent evidence. A reviewing court may reverse the [Board's] decision
or remand for further proceedings only if substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced. LC.§ 67-5279(4) ....

15
16
17
1fj

St Luke's Magic Valley Regl. Med. Ctr.J Ltd V Bd Of County Commrs. 0/Gooding County,

19
20

149 Idaho 584, 586, 237 P.3d 1210, 1212 (2010) (quoting Application ofAckerman, 127
I

Idaho 495, 49~97, 903 P.2d 84, 85-86 (1995) (internal citations omitted)).
21
22

23

When the [Board] was required.-.. to issue an order, the court shall affirm the
[Board's action] unless the court finds that the [Board's] findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the [Board]; (c) made

24
25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - PAGE 4

REDACTED

1
2

upon unlawful procedure; ( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Id (quoting Saint Alphonsus Reg!. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. Of County Commrs. Of Adq Cnty.,

3

146 Idaho 51, 53, 190 P.3d 870, 872 (2008) (quoting Idaho Code§ 67-52-79(3)).
4

Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal. See
5
6

Love v. Board of County Comm. Of Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558 (1985). If the court

7

cannot find any support for the agency's decision it can reverse the decision or remand the

8

case for further proceedings. Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 61 (1992).

Discussion

9

10
11

For purposes of d~termin:ing whether a patient qualifies for benefits, he or she must fit
the definition of ''medically indigent" set out in Idaho_ Code§ 31-3502(17), which reads:

12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19

''Medically in~igent" means any person who is in need of necessary medical
services and who, if an adult, together with his or her spouse, or whose parents
or guardian if a minor or dependent, does not have income and other resources
available to him from whatever source sufficient to pay for necessa,y medical
services. Nothing in this definition shall prevent the Board and the eounty
commissioners frori1 requirh~g the applicant and obligated persons to reimburse
the county arid the catastrophic health care cost program, where apptopriate,
for all o~ a portion of their medical expenses, when investigation of their
application pursuant to this chapter, detern1ines their apility to do so.
LC. § 31-3502(17) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "resources" available to a patient includes
"the ability of an applicant and obligated persons to pay for necessary medical expenses,

20 ·

excluding any interest charges, over a period ofup to five (5) years." LC.§ 31-3502(25). The .
21

Supreme Court has held that it is proper for a county board to impute income as a ~'resource',
22

23

24

to applicants in determining medical indigency status. In Re Freeman, 149 Idaho 584, 590,
237 P.3d 1210.

25
26
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The parties argued that this resolution of this case turns on the application of In Re
1

Freeman. The parties disagree as to whether imputed income of an involuntarily unemployed

2
3

patient_ may be considered in detenninirig whether, under I.C. § 31-3502, the patie11t is

4

medically indigent. As discussed below, however, the Court can determme this appeal

5

without reaching this issue.

6

I

St. Luke's argues that Ada County erred when it determined the patient was not

7

indigent because it imputed ~come based upon three job postings tha{were not "available" to
8

the patient. Ada County maintains that its decision to attribute income to the Patient was
9

based on substantial evidence in the record. Specifically," Ada County argues the evidence

10

work experience as a mechanic, and there were three job postings in line with his prior work

12

13

, experience.

14

The patient demonstrated that he had been diligently, but unsuccessfully, seeking full

lS-

time work after his medical procedure.

It appears that Ada County attributed full time

16

employment to the patient on the basis of an online inquiry of job 3 postings for the position
17
I

Iof "auto/shop technician" with the Idaho Department of Labor on November 15, 2013. T. at
18

19
20
21
22
23

24

7. R. at 291-95. There were 2 job postings for a "shop technician." R. at 292- 295. The job
description and experience needed for one of these positions included the following:
Job Description:
Fabricates components by analyzing requirements and welding parts
Experience in:
-Metal _F abrication
-Wire-feed Welding (MIG) and plasma cutting
-Wiring 12V

25

26
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1
2

3

4
5
6

-chassis wiring, tail, marker, stop and turn lights
-trailer wiring: 6 and 7 way plugs, Brake Controllers

-Wiring 11 OV
-basic connections and runni[n]g flecible conduit
Knowledge of basic:
-hydraulic systmes and hydraulic trouble shooting
·-PTO I Pu.mp installation and maintenance
-elecrtrical and mechanical troubleshooting
-Installation of flatbeds
R. at 292. The job description and experience for the other shop technician posting is mostly

7

identical. R. at 294. However, there is nothing in the record which would support a finding
8

that the patient had any of the required skills, experience or training for th~se tw? posi~ions ..
9

10·

In the Court's view, Ada County erred in attributing income to an individual on the basis of a

11

12

The third posting from the Department of Labor website was for an auto technician

13

posted by Meridian Automotive and Marine. R. at 291. While the defendant met all of the

14

qualifications for this job, the patient testified th~t he applied for a job with the same company

15

in the prior year and did not get interviewed or hired. Tr. at 16-17.

16

County erred in attributing income

Jn the Court's view, Ada

to an individual for a job with a particular e~ployer where

17

the individual applied for work 'With the same employer in the relevant time frame and was not
18
19
20

interviewed or hired.
· It c:lppears that Ada County's conclusion that the patient failed to establish medical

21

indigence by a preponderance of the evidence is based entirely on the review of the 3 postings

22

from the Department of Labor website. The patient was not qualified to perform the essential

23

functions of the two shop technician jobs. The patient, who is a certified mechanic, appears to

24
25
26
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be fully qualified for the third job. However, the patient applied for work within the prior year
1

at Meridian Automotive and did not get an interview or a job. The Court finds that Ada

2
3

County's attribution of full time work to this involuntarily unemployed individual is not

4

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Accordingly, Ada County's

5

finding that the patient failed to establish medical indigence by a preponderance of the

6

evidence is set aside.

7

Conclusion
8

As explained above, Ada County's finding that the patient failed to establish medical
9

indigence by a preponderance of the evidence is set aside, and the case is remanded to the
10
11

12

IT IS SO ORDERED.

13

Dated this

14

15

fl'

day of May, 2015.

pi#!!:·~

District Judge

16

17
18
19
20
21
22

23

24
25
26

I
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1
2

3
1

I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed,
by United States Mail, a true and correct copy of the within instrument as notice pursuant to
Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the attorneys ofrecord in this cause in envelopes addressed as
follows:

4

Ada County Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail

5
6

Mark C. Peterson
Moffatt Thomas
,PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

7

8
9

10

i

11

12
13 ·

14
15
16
17

18
19
20

[Date:
21

r~u2

CHRISTOPHERD. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho
By:

I

22

23
24

25
26
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of

FILED

)"
K0%E
1 3 14
--M

URT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR INDIGENCY MEDICAL
ASSISANCE FOR S.B. 1
Kootenai County Assltance
Reqeust No. 2018-260

Case No. CV28-19-1247
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION OF KOOTENAI
COUNTY BOARD. OF
COMMISSIONERS

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
The· matter before the Court is a petition for judicial review filed by Petitioner
Kootenai Health (KH), arising from the decision of the Respondent Kootenai County
Board of Commissioners (BOCC) to deny payment for medical services rendered to
patient, S.B. This Court finds the decision of the BOCC was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole1 was in excess of its. statutory authority,
and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of its discretion.
The statement of facts presented in KH's Brief on Appeal have been stipulated
to by BOCC. Br. Of Resp't. 2. BOCC further stipulates that S.B. received necessary
1

medical services, as defined by the Idaho Medically Indigent.Act (the Act). Id. On July

12, 2018, S.B. was admitted to KH following a severe psychiatric episode. Petitioner's
Br.

on Appeal, 1-2.

S.B. was diagnosed with major depressive order, alcohol use

disorder, alcohol withdrawal, and agoraphobia. Id. at 2. She was treated in the KH
MEMORANDUM DECIStON ANO ORDER
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psychiatric unit and discharged six days later, on July 18, 2018, Id. S.S. did not have
health insurance at the time, and her total charge for treatment amounted to
$26,672.31. Id.

On July 17, 2018, S.B. signed and submitted an application for county
assistance under the Act. Id. KH signed the·application as the third party, and it was
filed with the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare on August 2, 2018. Id.
The application was denied, and thereafter forwarded. to Kootenai County
Assistance on August 7, 2018. Id. at 3. On August 30, 2018, S.S. attended an
interview where she was asked about her income and expenses. Id. She withdrew her
application at that time, but shortly thereafter received a phone call from a
representative of KH, who explained the application process to her. Id. After receiving
that information1 S.B. chose to continue with the application process. Id. Kootenai
County Assistance refused to reschedule the interview and instead issued a Clerks
Statement of Findings and Recommendation of Initial Denial for County Assistance. Id.
KH appealed the decision of Kootenai County Assistance on October 4, 2018.
/d. A second interview was conducted with S.B., where S.B. answered all questions

asked of her and provided all requested documentation. Id. On January 22. 2019, a
full appeal hearing if the initial denial was held before the BOCC. Id. The BOCC
imputed income to S.B. to a level where she no longer qualified for county assistance,
and thereafter voted unanimously to uphold the initial denial of county assistance. Id.
On February 18, 2019. KH filed the present Petition for Judicial Review. Id. KH
filed Petitioners Brief on Appeal on April 22, 2019. On May 20, 2019, the BOCC filed
Brief of Respondent KH filed Petitioner's Reply Brief on June 6, 2019. Oral argument
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was held on July 23, 2019, at the conclusion of which this Court took the matter under
advisement.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Judicial review of a final determination of denial of medical indigency benefits by
a board of county commissioners is to be made in the same as that of any
administrative determination or order, in accordance with the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act, Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code (IDAPA). See 1.C. §§ 31-1506, 31 ..
3505G. Thus, the board of county commissioners is the wagency" for purposes of

judicial review under IDAPA. The scope of judicial review of administrative decisions is
as follows:
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
[ ]

...

(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency
action unless the court finds ·that the agency's findings, infer.ences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be-set aside, in whole or in
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) an.d (3) of this
section agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of·the
appellant have been prejudiced.
1

I.C. § 67--5279. Judicial review of an order issued by a board of county commissioners
is limited to the record. In re Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495,496, 903 P.2d
85, 85 (1995). The board's findings of fact are to be upheld if they are supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 496-97, 903 P.2d at 85-86.
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Ill. ANALYSIS
As set forth below, this Court finds the decision of the BOCC was not supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, was in excess of its statutory
authority, and was arbitrary, capricious! and an abuse of its discretion. As a preliminary
note, the interests of S.B. and KH are aligned, and both are adversarial to the BOCC.
This is because KH takes the facts which would prove or disprove S.B.'s indigency. KH
would obtain funds from the medical indigency fund for services it rendered to S.B. if
the criteria are met, and KH obtains no funds if those criteria are not met. Conversely,
BOCC holds on to those funds if those criteria are met, and loses monies from that fund
if KH and S.B. meet the criteria for medical indigency. Not only are KH and S.B.
adverse to the BOCC, but the BOCC Is also the judge and jury, as the BOCC hears the
evidence a·nd makes the decision as to whether KH and S.B. have met that criteria.
A brief description of the statutory framework and case law regarding policy for
that statutory scheme is in order. The Idaho Medically Indigent Act is found in Idaho
Code§ 31--3501 et. seq.
It is the policy of this state that each person, to the maximum extent
possible, is responsible for his or her own medical care and that of his or
her dependents and to that end, shall be encouraged to purchase his or
her own medical insurance with coverage sufficient to prevent them from
needing to request assistance pursuant to this chapter. However, in order
to safeguard the public health, safety and welfare, and to provide suitable
facilities and provisions for the care and hospitalization of persons in this
state, and in the case f medically Indigent residents, to provide for the
payment thereof, the respective counties of this state, and the board and
the department shall have the duties and powers as hereinafter provided.
I.C. § 31 .. 3501. The intent of the county medical assistance program ... is to extend
1

broad coverage to those who, due to calamitous circumstances are faced with medical
costs they cannot hope to meet." Carpenterv. Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 575,582,
691 P.2d 1190 (1984). "Medically indigent" is defined as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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"Medically indigent" means any person who is in need of necessary
medical services and who, if an adult, together with his or her spouse, or
whose parents or guardian if a minor or dependent, does not have income
and other resources available to him from whatever source sufficient to
pay for necessary medical services. Nothing in this definition shall
prevent the board and the county commissioners from requiring the
applicant and obligated persons to reimburse the county and the
catastrophic health care cost program, where appropriate, for all or a
portion of their medical expenses, when investigation of their app;lication
pursuant to this chapter, determines their ability to do so.
I.C. § 31-3502(17). "Resources" is defined as follows:
"Resources•• means all property, for which an applicant and/or an
obligated person may be eligible or in which he or she may have an
interest. Whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, liquid or
nonliquld, or pending, including, but not limited to, all forms of public
assistance, crime victims compensation, worker's compensation, veterans
benefits, medicaid, medicare, supplemental security income (SSI), third
party insurance, other insurance or apply for section 1011 of the medicare
modernization act Of 2003, if applicable, and any other property from any
source. Resources shall include the ability Of an applicant and obligated
persons to pay for necessary medical services, excluding any interest
charges, over a period Of up to five (5) years starting on the date
necessary medical services are first provided.
'

I.C. § 31-3502(25). Counsel for KH correc11y·notes:
In broad strokes, the Act requires the county clerk to interview the
patient and investigate their income, assets and allowable expenses in
order to determine whether they have sufficient discretionary income to
pay the hospital bill over a five year period. If they have sufficient
discretionary income then they are not medically 1·ndigent.
Conversely, if they do not have sufficient discretionary income then
they are declared medically indigent. If the patient is medically indigent,
then the county where the patient resides will pay the medical provider the
first $11,000;.00 of the medical charges and any excess amount will be
paid directly to the medical provider out Of the Idaho Catastrophic Fund in
Boise (hereinafter referred to as CAT Fund" or "CAT Board").
The· patient will then enter 1nto a repayment program with the
county.
11

Petr's Br. on Appeal, 7, 8. As to this last concept of "reimbursement", Idaho Code§ 313510A (1) defines "Reimbursement" as follows:
(1) Receipt of financial assistance pursuant to this chapter shall
obligate an applicant to reimburse the obligated county and the board for
such reasonable portion ofthe financial assistance paid on behalf of the
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~pplicant as the county commissioners may determine that the applicant
1s able to pay from resources over a reasonable period of time. Cash
amounts received shall be prorated between the county and the board in
proportion to the amount each has paid.
***

(6) The county commissioners may require the emplo_yment of
such of the medically indigent as are capable and able to work and whose
attending physician certifies they are capable of working.
While this statute deals with "reimbursement'', that is, the duty of the claimant to repay
the county for medical indigency funds expended on their b~half (and the concept of
"reimbursement" is not at issue in S.B.'s case), this statute defining "reimbursemene
was used by the Idaho Supreme Court in St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical

Center, Ltd. V. Board of County Com'rs of Gooding County, 149 Idaho 584, 237 P.3d
1210 (2010), as the lynchpin or starting point in coming up with the concept of "imputed
income." The concept of "imputed income" Is not found in the Medically Indigent Act 1

but is a creation by the Idaho Supreme Court in St. Lukes. Before discussing St. Luke's,
the Court will discuss two other cases cited to the Court.
In Carpenter v. Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 575, 691 P.2d 1190 (1984), the

county commissioners found Clarence Carpenter was not medically indigent at the time
his wife incurred hospital expenses in a hospitalization that eventually resulted in her
death. 107 Idaho at 578,691 P.2d at 1193. The district court reversed the decision of
the county commissioners, and the commissioners appealed. The Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's decision which reversed the county commissioners'
decision. Clarence Carpenter was employed by a farmer who earned $750 per month
plus the farmer provided Clarence housing. 107 Idaho at 579, 691 P.2d at 1194. After

his wife's death, Clarence quit his job because his daughter did not want him living alone
and his son-in-law needed help on his farm. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held the
county commissioners were not bound by the fact that Clarence had virtually no income,
MEMORANDUM DECISION ANO ORDER
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they could consider all the facts, including that Clarence was a healthy Individual who
had voluntarily quit his job. 107 Idaho at 585, 691 P.2d at 1200. Ca,penterdid not deal
with imputation because even if the $750 per month were taken into consideration,
Clarence was still .medically indigent. Id. However, Carpenter certainly paved the way
for ''imputation" to be created.
In Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495, 903 P.2d 94 (1995), the Idaho
Supreme Court found Ackerman presently has the abillty·to pay off his medical
expenses in a reasonable time ... but for his lifestyle choices. 127 Idaho at 497--98, 903
P.2d at 86-87. Those lifestyle choices were Ackerman•s discretionary expenditures of

satellite television service, cell phone service and ·credit card debt. 127 Idaho at 498;
903 P.2d at 87.
Most pertinent to S.B.'s case is St. Luke's. In that case, Megan Freeman
Incurred emergency medical expenses from St. Luke's hospital. The board of county
commissioners determined she was not medically indigent, as they imputed income to
Freeman becaus_e she was voluntarily unemployed:outside of her home. 149 Idaho at
586, 237 P.3d at 1212. Freeman testified that she was "able-bodied and able to work."
149 Idaho at 590, 237 P.3d at 1216. The district court affirmed the board of county
commissioners and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. In doing so, the
Idaho Supreme Court stated, "as a matter of first impression, a patient's potential
income may properly be imputed as a resource. for purpose of determining whether the
patient Is medically indigent." 149 Idaho at 584, 237 P.3d at 1210. ''We do not criticize
Freeman's choice not to work outside her home; we are simply unable to agree with St.
Luke's contention that the taxpayers of Gooding County are required to provide financial
assistance in support of that choice." 149 Idaho at 590, 237 P.3d at 1216.
As mentioned above, Idaho Code§ 31-3510A (1), the definition of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

MReimbursement" was the lynchpin for the Idaho Supreme Court's creation of the
Mimputation of income" doctrine. That analysis lsas follows:

Our- starting point Is the Legislature's express declaration found in
I.C. § 31-3501 [now 31-3501 (1)]: "It is the policy of this state that each
person, to the maximum extent possible, is resp·onsible for his or her .own
medical care .... " Consistent with this policy, I.C. § 31.....;3510A, entitled
Reimbursement," requires anyone who receives financial assistance for
medical expenses from a county to reimburse the county "for such
reasonable porlion of the fin,mcial assistance paid on behalf of the
applicant as the board may determine that the applicant Is able to pay
from resources over a reasonable period of time." J.C.§ 31-3510A(1)
(emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 31-351.0A(6) further provides that in
seeking reimbursttment, "[t]he board may require the employment of such
of the medically indigent as are capable and able to work and whose
attend Ing physician certifies they are capable of working." St. Luke's
argues that because this provision is the only one that expressly mentions
potential income, the Legislature must have intended-that the Board
consider potential income when determining how much a person is
required to reimburse the County, but not when consictering whether a
person is indigent in the first place.
When J.C. §§ 31-351 0A(1) and (6) are read together. it is clear that
the Legislature intended for the potential income of an able-bodied person
to be considered as a .,resource" from which that person may be obligated
to reimburse the county. We do not view the Legislature as having
intended the word "resources" to have different meanings within Chapter
35, Title 31. Indeed, I.C. § 31-3502 declares that j'(a]s used in this
chapter, the terms defined in this section shall have the following
meaning, unless the context clearly indicates another meaning .... " This
declaration is consistent with tong--standing rules of statutory
interpretation; "'Other portions of the same act or section may be
resorted to as an aid to determine the sense in which a word, phrase; or
clause is used, and such phrase, word, or clause, repeatedly used in a
statute, will be presumed to bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless there is something to show that there is a different
meaning intended, such as a difference in subject-matter which might
raise a different presumption.' 11 Kerley v. Wetherell, 61 Idaho 31, 41, 96
P.2d 503,508 (1939) (quoting Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,631,269
P. 993, 996 (1928)).
In view of the explicit mandate that the -terms defined in I. C.. § 313502 are to be consistently afforded the same meaning throughout the
chapter, if the Board should consider potential Income as a resource
under I.C. § 31-3510A for purposes of reimbursement. it should also
consider potential Income as a resource under J.C.§ 31-3502(1),
regarding medical indigency. This conclusion is in keeping with the
definition of medlcally indigent" which considers both income and other
resources.
11

11
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The dissent! focusing heavily on Freeman's present Inability to pay
for the cost of her medical care and relying on our decision in Univ. of
Utah Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. Twin Falls Cnty., 122 Idaho 1010, 842 P.2d
689 (1992)1 asserts that the hardship of any waiting period for payment
must fall on the counties, not hospitals." It is true that this Court stated in
that case that w[t]he more reasonable interpretation hs that •available' in
I.C. § 31-3502(1) denotes currently or immediately obtainable income or
resources and a corresponding present ability to pay, rather than a future
ability to pay, or a potential future ability to pay." Id. at 1015, 842 P.2d at
694 (emphasis original). However, in 1996, the Legislature rejected this
Court's view of a "more reasonable interpretation," defin-ing wresources" to
winclude the ability of an applicant and obligated persons to pay for
necessary medical services over a period of up to three '(3) years." 1996
Idaho Sess~ Laws ch. 410; § 3, p. 1360; Evidently satisfied with the
hospitals' ability to wait for payment, In 200.5 the Legislature extended the
period to five years. 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 281, § 1, p. 917. In view
of these actions, we are unable to reach the dissent's conclusion
regarding the allocation of hardship. Our conclusion that a patient's
potential income may properly be considered as a "resource" is also
consistent with previous decisions from this Court.
In 1984, when this Court decided Carpenter v. Twin Falls County,
107 Idaho 575,691 P.2d 1190 (1984), I.C. § 31-3502(1) defined
"medically indigenr as "any person who is in need of hospitalization and
who, if an adult, together with his or her spouse, ... does not have income
and other resources available to him from wh~tever source which shall be
sufficient to enable the person to pay for necessary medical services."
Carpenter, 107 Idaho at 583,691 P.2d at 1198. Idaho Code§ 31-3502
did not yet contain an express definition of "resources." 1984 Idaho Sess.
Laws ch. 99 § 1, p. 227. Against this statutory backdrop, Carpenter
applied for county assistance for medical bills incurred in connection with
his wife's terminal illness. Carpenter, 107 Idaho at 577,691 P.2d at 1192.
He quit his Job after making the application. Id. at 579, 691 P.2d at 1194.
On appeal, it was claimed that he "clearly was medically indigent because
at the time of the hearing before the [Board] he had virtually no income."
Id. at 585, 691 P.2d at 1200. This Court ultimately held that w[e]ven if we
assume that Carpenter was capable of earning the income he. was
receiving at the time his application was filed ... the facts set forth above
demonstrate that Mr. Carpenter" is indigent. Id.. The Court also stated,
however, that it was ptoper for the commission "to consider all the facts,
including that Mr. Carpenter was a healthy individual who had voluntarily
quit his job." Id.
This Court later decided Application of Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495,
903 P.2d 84 (1995). At that time, the act defined "medically indigent" just
as it had in Carpenterand did not yet expressly define iresources." 127
Idaho at 497, 903 P.2d at 88; 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 112, § 1, p. 283.
The appellant in Ackerman argued that he met the definition of "medically
indigent" because he did not have a reserve of funds to pay off his
medical bills all at once. 127 Idaho at 4971 903 P.2d at 86. The Court
11

1

1
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disagreed, stating that "Ackerman presently has the ability to pay off his
medical expenses in a reasonable time ... but for his lifestyle choices." Id.
at 497-98, 903 P.2d at 86-87. The lifestyle choices the Court was
referring to were Ackerman's discretionary expenditures, incl·udi.ng satellite
television service, cell phone service, and credit card debt. Id. at 498, 903
P.2d at 87.
In view of the statutory framework and these two decisions, we find
no legal error in the Board's detennination that it was proper to impute
income to Freeman as a resource." We do not criticize Freeman's choice
not to work outside her home; we are simply unable to agree with St.
Luke's contention that the taxpayers of Gooding County are required to
provide financial assistance in support of that choice.
11

149 Idaho at 588--90, 237 P.3d at 1214-16 (footnote omitted).
The pivotal fact in St. Luke's is that Megan Freeman was "able. bodied." There
was no dispute about that fact, Freeman admitted she was "ab(e..bodied." In the present
case, the BOCC never made a finding that S.B. was "able-bodied." While such a finding
might be implicit in the BOCC's ultimate decision to deny S.B. medical lndigency status,
the BOCC never made such a finding. For that reason alone, the BOCC's decision must
be reversed. Even if the BOCC had made the finding that S.B. was "able--bodied''. such
a decision would not be supported by substantial evidence.
While ldaho·Code § 31-3510A was the starting point for the Idaho Supreme
Court in creating "imputation of income", the next pivotal statutory piece was Idaho Code
§ 31-3510A(6), where the Idaho Supreme Court in St. Luke's wrote, as noted above:

Idaho Code§ 31-35-10A(6) further provides that In seeking
reimbursement, "[t]he bdard may require the employment of such of the
medically indigent as are capable and able to work and whose attending
physician certifies they are capable of working."
11

149 Idaho at 588-90, 237 P.3d at 1214-16. This concept of a "doctor's note found its
way into the BOCC's decision, when Commission Chaimian Fillies closed S.B.'s hearing
as follows:
So in this case-this is a very, very-It's a-your situation is certainly
challenging um-my inclination at this point, and especially absent a
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doctor•s note indicating that you --your unable to work and unable to work
a 40 hour week-uh-I would be inclined to deny, but as a Chairman, I
cannot make the motion.
Tr. p. 16, Ll.11-15. In doing so, Commission Chairman Fillies, and the BOCC (since
they all voted in favor of denying S.B.'s claim for medical indigency), made two
incredibly huge errors of law and fact.
First, the error of law. A plairi reading of the "doctor note" concept from St. Luke's
shows that two things are needed under Idaho Code§ 31-3510A(6); one, that S.B. is
capable and able to work, and two, the applicant1s attending physician certifies they are
capable of working. In making his finding, that it was up to S.B. to come up with a
doctor's note that says uyou are unable to work and unable to work a 40 hour week" in
order to avoid the imputation of income, Chairman Fillies clearly put the burden on S.B.
to come up with a doctor's note which says she can't work. Id. That is not what St.

Luke's and Idaho Code§ 31-3510A(6) require. In order to apply the "imputation of
income" doctrine, it is the BOCC's burden to come up with the "doctor note" because the
statue, Idaho Code§ 31-3510A(6), as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in St. Luke's,
reads: "[t]he board may require the employment of such of the medically indigent as are
capable and able to work and whose attending physician certifies they are capable of
1
'

working. 149 ldahoat 58~-90, 237 P.3d at 1214-16. (emphasis added). St. Luke's
and Idaho Code § 31-351 0A(6) make it clear that in order for "imputation of Income" to
be used by the BOCC, the applicant must be a) capable and able to work, and b) have a

doctor's note to that effect, le., that she can work. Neither of those exist in S.B.'s case.
First, there is no testimony, no evidence of any kind, that S.8. can work at any other·job
or work at her current job any more than she is presently working. Second, no such
doctor's note is-present in this case. At the end of this decision, this Court will discuss in
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more detail why the burden of proof, both the burden of production and burden of
persuasion of proving "imputation", is at all times on the BOCC.
Second, there is an error In fact. Even if the burden of proving she could not
work at a job all year round were foisted upon S.B., S.B. has proven that she cannot
work at her current job all year round, and there is no proof that a similar additional job
exists with similar accommodations where she could work the rest of the year. That is
the uncontradicted testimony in S.B.'s case. Those are the only facts. There is a
"doctor's note" in S. B. 's easel but that doctor's note corroborates all of S. B. 's testimony.
The "doctor's note" in this case adds to the uncontradicted fact that S.B. is working as
much as she can within her limitations. The doctor's note does not "certify [S.B.] is
capable of working." Id. Instead, the "doctor', note" pertaining to S.B. simply notes her
physical and mental health limitation as they relate to work. The only evidence is the
medical record which discusses her physical limitations and mental health limitations.
On January 8, 2019, Erika Mikles, ·Physician Assistant for Heritage Health, wrote:
[SB] is a patient that has been known to my practice for 6 years.
[patient] is requesting paperwork for her disability, on 01/08/2019. I have
enclosed a copy of the office evaluation for your records. Once again,
thank you for allowing me to participate in the care of this patient.
She has chronic back pain, teriology unknown because she has not
been able to afford imaging to work this up. Her back pain limits
prolonged standing, sitting. It also limit$ how much she can lift. She also
has chronic depression and anxiety and has been on medication for years
for this. Her depression has caused some social isolation and problems
with motivation and communication with others.
A.R. 89.

S.8. testified before the board of county commissioners. S.B. verified that her
medical records show she has chronic back pain which limits prolonged standing, sitting,
and how much she can lift. Tr. p. 6, LI. 10-14. She verlfaed those records show "She
also has chronic depression and anxiety and has been on medication for years for this.
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Her depression is caused from social isolation and problems with motivation and
communication with others." Id. LI. 14-16. She testified she hasn't worked a full 40 hour
week in about fifteen years due to her back pain. Id. at 6, LI 18-20. She testified that
due to her back pain she can't sit or stand that long and can only work for about three
hours doing projects. Id. p. 7, LI. 1-5. S.B. testified she needs to take breaks. and is
allowed to take breaks, even doing the very sedentary activity of bookkeeping for her
accountant employer. S.B. testified:
Commissioner Duncan: Do you enjoy the work you do book
keeping?
S.B.: Um-sometimes it's very stressful but-.I want to work
around that-you know-learn my tools-this will be rny first year of
sobriety to do taxes so-uh it gets overwhelming you know-I try to push
through, I take breaks, I you know-we work out of our home-some days
fortunately I can go down to my room and take a break for a while.
Id. p. 12, LI. 10-15. The only evidence is that S. B. works less than full time when she is

working, and that she can t work full time due to her physical limitations alone.
1

Additionally, S.B. has limitations as a result of her mental health, as mentioned in the
medical report from her Physician's Assistant, above. S.B. was asked at her hearing:
Chairman Fillios: So if you could work-if the job were a
combination were a combination where you had the flexibility to both sit
and stand-would that enable you to work a 40 hour week?
S.B.: I don't think I could handle it. It makes me nervous working a
40 hour week. It's real intimidating to me.
131 LI. 3-7. Additionally, S.B. does not work all year around, but the on/yevidence is
that SB isn't choosing to work only six months out of the year, rather it is her employer
that chooses to employ her only half of the year. S.B. testified she works approximately
six months a year «Depending on our workload. I finish up easy by the first of the year."
Tr. p. 5 LI. 14-16.
A plain reading of St. Luke's is the Idaho Supreme Court allowed "imputation of
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work" to be used in medical indigency cases, but only as follows: H[t]he board may
require the employment of such of the medically indigent as are capable and able to
work and whose attending physician certifies they are capable of working." 149 Idaho at
588-90, 237 P.3d at 1214-16 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court did not
11
state that imputation of work" can be used in medical indigency cases when the

0
11
claimant Is working, but the commissioners feel the claimant could be working more

hours or at a better paying job. At oral argument, counsel for the BOCC argued that
S.B. was "voluntarily seasonally unemployed" not underemployed. The Idaho Supreme
Court did not state that "imputation of work" can be used in medical indigency cases
where the claimant was "voluntarily seasonally unemployed" or where they were
underemployed. The Idaho Supreme Court only allowed imputation when the person
was unemployed (not working at all) and physically able to work as verified by a doctor's
note. In the present case, the BOCC has taken St. Luke's and turned it on its head.
Through a misreading of St. Luke's. this BOCC has contorted the facts and the law to
deny S.B. medical indigency, when they (or a different set of BOCC) had approved her
in the past. The only thing that changes was the misreading of St. Luke's; the facts
have not changed because S.B.'s situation has not changed. There is no reason for this
Court to expand St. Luke's to the BOCCis wholly unsupported interpretation. St. Luke's

was a split decision by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2010. The only remaining justice on
the Idaho Supreme Court at the present time is Justice Burdick, and he dissented in St.
Luke's. Justice Burdick and Justice Warren Jones dissented, finding that future income

should not constitute a resource for medical indigency, because It is too speculative, and
because the statutory interpretation in the majority opinion is incorrect. 149 Idaho at

592-96, 237 P.3d at 1218-22. Justice Burdick is correct on both counts. Justice Burdick
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points out the speculation by the majority in St. Luke's because, "[t]he fact that the
Board in this case arbitrarily found that, given the correct circumstance, Freeman would
be able to pay her medical costs in no way means that such circumstantial speculation
will come to fruition:' 149 Idaho at 594, 237 P.3d

at 1220. The point is, why is St.

Luke's being penalized for being able to access the medical indigency fund for
Freeman's medical expenses, when ·there is no way of knowing whether Freeman will
ever go back to work during the next five years? As to statutory interpretation, Justice
Burdick is absolutely correct in pointing out:
The -majority's use of the reimbursement provision to illustrate that
speculative future income constitutes a resource for deterrnining eligibility
for medical lndlgency benefits is improper. The title of I.C. § 31-3510A,
"Reimbursement," indicates that any power granted to the counties by the
reimbursement provision is only applicable after the county has found that
the individual is medically indigent and has also provided her with
indigency benefits.
Although future income is a "resource" with respect to an
individual's ability to reimburse the county for medical assistance under
I.C. § 31-351 0A(1), it is not a "resource" for the purposes of determining
whether an individual qualifies for medical indigency benefits in the first
place. Until a person Is found to be medically indigent and has received
benefits, there can be no reimbursement and I.C. § 31-3510A cannot be
applied, Therefore, I.C. § 31-3510A(6) cannot be .read in conjunction with
I.C. § 31-3510A(1) 1 as the majority suggests, to expand the scope of what
constitutes a "resource" for purposes of determining eligibility for medical
indigency benefits. Rather, for a form of capital to constitute a uresource"
for the purpose of determining eligibility for medical indigency benefits1
authotity must be found in the language of I.C .. § 31-3502(17), which, in
this case, does not exist.
149 Idaho at 594, 237 P.3d at 1220. This Court finds there is a very real possibility that·
the imputation of income doctrine found in St. Luke's is no longer good law. At the very
least, there is absolutely no reason for this Court to expand upon the St. Luke;s decision
and countenance the BOCC's bastardized interpretation of that case.
There was no finding by the BOCC that S.B. was not credible. Thus, S.B. was
implicitly found to be credible. The Commission even noted that on other prior
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Page 16

occasions going back to 2011, the Commissioners had approved S.B. as being
medically indigent, where the Commission did not impute income on those prior
occasions .. Tr. 4, LI. 2-4. If nothing has changed for S.B. in the last nine years 1 then it is
relevant that she was approved for county assistance these other times. The only thing
that changed is this set of Commissioners imputed Income. The problem is they did it
without any basis, without any evidence supporting that decision, ·and by entirely
misreading St. Luke's.
As a matter of law, the Commission misunderstood the doctrine of wimputation".
Perhaps that was because at the beginning of the hearing, the three commissioners
were misinformed by their County Assistance Interviewer, Deanna Go~selin, who said at
the hearing: "Per Idaho Code §31-3502(25) potential income of an abl~bodied person
must be considered as a resource from which a person is obligated to pay for his or her
own medical care over a reasonable period of time." Tr. p. 3, LI. 12-14. That is not what
Idaho Code § 31 ·3502(25) says. Nothing in that subsection of that statute breathes a
word about an "able bodied person." As mentioned above, that subsection of that
statute reads:
(25) "Resources" means all property, for which an applicant and/or an

obligated person may be eligible or in which he or she may have an
interest, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, liquid or
nonliquid, or pending, including, but not limited to, all forms of public
assistance,. crime victims compensation. worker's compensation, veterans
benefits, medicaid, medicare, supplemental security income (SSl)1 third
party insurance, other insurance or apply for section 1011 of the medlcare
modernization act of 2003, if applicable, and any other property from any
source. Resources shall include the ability of an applicant and obligated
persons to pay for necessary medical services, excluding any interest
charges, over a period of up to five (5) years starting on the date
necessary medical services are first provided. For purposes of
determining approval for medical indigency only, resources shall not
include the value of the homestead on the applicant or obligated person's
residence, a buri·a1 plot, exemptions for personal property allowed in
section 11 ..605(1) through (3), Idaho Code, and additional exemptions
allowed by county resolution.
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I.C. § 31 .. 3502(25). It is the St. Luke,s case which discussed the concept of being 11 ab1e ..
bodied." Megan Freeman testified that she was "able-bodied and able to work.n 149
Idaho at 590,237 P.3d at 1216. That being the case, imputation of income was allowed
by the majority of the Idaho Supreme Court. in the present case, S.8. is not "ablebodied." The Commissioners did not find her to be "able-bodied", there was no
discussion at all by the Commissioners about her being 11 able-bodied." Had they made
such a finding, such would not have been supported_ by substantial evidence. The only
evidence is that S.B. is not 11 able~bodied." That being the case, as a matter of law,
imputation of other work is not allowed under the St. Luke's case. As a matter of fact,
imputation of other work (that being the Qualfon position) is not supported by any
evidence, let alone substantial evidence.
Any "facts" regarding "imputation" was also Introduced to this case by the County
Assistance Interviewer, Deann·a Gosselin, who stated at the beginning of the hearing:
Qualfon is hiring and starts at the very least $9.25 per hour with
generous incentives to make much more per hour. If she made $9.25 per
hour that would give her $1,603133 per month. :eased on the imputation
of income set forth above, she would have discretionary income in the
amount of %529.83 per month. The medical bills of $26,672.31 divided
by 60 [months] equals $444.54. (S.B.] has had other approved
applications with the County Assistance Program going back to 2011
where at that time we did not impute income. The approved applications
have gone to collections and there has never been any attempt by [SB], to
pay them prior to being turned over to collections. This concludes my
summary.
Tr. p. 3 L. 28-p. 4 L. 6. "Imputation" was not discussed by the BOCC in its conclusion
1

1

at the end of the hearing. Tr. p. 151 I. 18-p.17, L. 5. However, without "imputation",
there is no way the BOCC could have reached its decision denying her claim. The
record contains Exhibit R, which is a job description for "Customer Service
Representative" at Qualfon. AR 93, 94. One of the requirements is the "Ability to
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Page 17

efficiently navigate and multi--task computer systems such as email, and client computer
programs. 11 Id. 94.
S.B. was asked, "How are your computer skills?" to which she replied, "I have
none." Tr. p. 12, LI. 16-17. S.B. was asked if she was going to learn computer skills,
and she answered:
Uh-sure I just had not. It's something that hasn't really applied.
I've had to learn to apply for my unemployment and things lik~ that-I'm
kind of against all that technology so-but I know it's good for me to
learn-I got a tablet from a friend so I'm trying to learn how to use it.
Tr. p. 13, LI. 3--7. She also testified:
Um-I don•t have a lot of other skills but labor so that's been a real
struggle for me. The work world is way different trying to get in to.like
learning the computers and dressing professionat and presenting myself
differently, different job sites are a lot different-and all the boys ... so I'm
trying to learn new skills and better my life.
Tr. p. 15, LI. 12--17. The only evidence is that SB does not have computer skills. Trying
to learn how to use a friend's tablet does not equate to the "Ability to efficientty navigate
and multi-task computer systems such as email, and client computer programs" which
Qualfon requires. Id. at 94. Having to learn to apply for unemployment via a computer
also does not equate to the "Ability to efficiently navigate and multi-task computer
systems such as email, and client computer programs" which Qualfon requires. Id. The
imputation of the potential job at Qualfon Is not supported by substantial evidence.
In addition to her lack of computer skills, when one looks at Qualfon's other
1
requirements and compares them to the only evidence of record as to SB s abilities, the

ability of S.B. to do the job at Qualfon is all the more preposterous:
As an agent representative you will:
Handle and respond to inbound phone calls via telephone and occasional
email inquiries
Upsell products and services based on customer needs
Maintain and promote a positive attitude while meeting· productivity goals
Demonstrate the ability to create, add, edit and troubleshoot within the
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client computer system
What You WIii Nead to Succeed:
Amazing customer service and insights
Ability to accept inbound calls and apply empathetic customer service
support
Experience in a customer support environment is preferred (retail,
hospitality, restaurants, etc.)
Ability to communicate effectively via telephone and email by using active
listening and clearly speaking to the customer
Ability to efficiently navigate and multi-taks computer systems such as
email, and client computer programs
Ability to attend 100% of our paid training program, without absences.
Depending on the department, training is 24 weeks long.
AR, 94. S.B. essentially has none of those qualities or abilities which are either required
or preferred by Qualfon. S.B. testified that, "I'll be 60 this year so ... you know I have
done labor all my life-a house painter by trade." Tr. p. 13, LL 9--11. SB has no
customer service background. The only evidence is that SB struggles to perform
bookkeeping part time for half of the year, in a job where her employer allows her to
work at home and take breaks whenever she wants. The Imputation of the potential job
at Qualfon is not supported by substantial evidence.
As mentioned above, this Court must return to a discussion on the burden of
proof. The BOCC clearly put the burden of proof on S.B. to prove a negative, that she
can't work more than she currently is working. Even with that shifted burden, the only
evidence is that S.B. cannot work more than she currently is working. Because the
majority opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court in St. Luke's did not address who bears the
burden of its newly created doctrine of "imputation", this Court will address who bears
the burden of proof. "Imputation" of work is analogous to the concept of the "doctrine of
avoidable consequences" or the "failure to mitigate" damages in a personal injury case.
In a personal injury case, if a person can work they have a duty to mitigate their lost
income damages, past and future, through a calculation of what that person used to
make before the Injury, less what that person could make after the injury based on their
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remaining ability to work. Also, damages would be reduced to the extent the plaintiff did
something to make his or her injuries worse and his or her damages greater. While the
plaintiff has the "duty" to mitigate if possible, it is the defendant who bears the "burden"
of proving the plaintiff's failure to mitigate. As to mitigation of damages, the burden of

production of evidence and the burden of persuasion of evidence, Is always on the
defendant. Preston v. Keith, 584 A.2d 439,444, 217 Conn. 12, 21 (Conn. 1991). In

Preston, the Connecticut Supreme Court explained:
The rationale for this rule is well established. A defendant claiming
that the plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages" 'seeks to be benefited by
a particular matter of fact, and he should, therefore, prove the matter
alleged by him. The rule requires hirn to prove an affirmative fact,
whereas the opposite rule would call upon the plaintiff to prove a negative,
and therefore the proof should come from the defendant. He is the
wro_ngdoer, and presumptions between him and the person wronged
should be made in favor of the latter. For this reason, therefore1 the onus
must in all such cases be upon the defendant.' n 1 T. Sedgwick, Damages
(9th Ed.1912) § 227, p. 448.
To claim successfully that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages,
the defendant "must show that the injured party failed to take reasonable
action to lessen the damages; that the damages were in fact enhanced by
such failure; and that the damages which could have been avoided can be
measured with reasonable certainty." 2 M. Minzer, supra, §-16.10, p. 16-

18.
11

584 A.2d at 444,217 Conn. at 21. The BOCC is the party which seeks to be
benefitted" by imputation; Kootenai County does not have to pay out of the medical

indigency fund if they can legally impute income to S.B. However, the BOCC has the
burden of production of evidence and the burden of persuasion with that evidence; to do
otherwise would require S.B. to prove a negative ... she must prove that she cannot do
the job at Qualfon (which she proved anyway). This is also the law in Idaho:
The doctrine of avoidable consequences, or the duty to mitigate, is
an affirmative defense that provides for a reduction in damages where a
defendant proves that it would have been reasonable for the plaintiff to
take steps to avoid the full extent of the damages caused by the
defendant's actionable conduct. Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho,
N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 170, 765 P.2d 680,681 (1988). Where an injured
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party takes steps to mitigate the damages caused by another, she is
entitled 'to the costs she reasonably incurs in avoiding those damages.
Casey v. Nampa & Meridian In-. Dist., 85 Idaho 299,305,379 P.2d 409,
412 (1963) (citing Christensen v. Gorton, 36 Idaho 438, 211 P. 446
(1922); 15 Am.Jur. Damages§ 27; 25 C.J.S. Damages§ 35). The
doctrine of avoidable consequences seeks to "discourage even persons
against whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering
economic loss which could be averted by reasonable efforts .... " Indus.
Leasing Corp. v. Thomason, 96 Idaho 574,577,532 P.2d 916,919 (1974)
(quoting Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119, 121 (1965)).
Whether it is reasonable to expect a plaintiff to perform specific acts of
mitigation is a question of fact. Casey, 85 Idaho at 307, 379 P.2d at 413.
The defendant bears the burden of proving that the proposed
means of mitigation were reasonable under the circumstances, could be
accomplished at a reasonable cost, and were within the -plaintiff's ability;
Id. Proof of the latter of these three requires more than a mere
suggestion that a means of mitigation exists. Clark v. Int'/ Harvester Co.,
99 Idaho 326, 347 581 P.2d 784, 805 (1978). Thus, where a plaintiff..
farmer sought damages in the form of lost profits related to a tractor that
did not perform as anticipated, this Court concluded that although the
plaintiff could have rented a substitute tractor, the defendant was not
entitled to a reduction In damages because the defendant had failed to
demonstrate any mitigating effects would have flowed from such a rental.
Id. Similarly, where a defendant refused to rescind a contract-for the sale
of a broodmare which, subsequent to the sale, was found to be infertile,
the Court of Appeals held that the defendant's mere assertion that
plaintiffs could have engaged veterinary services to assess the mare's
fertility was insufficient. Whitehouse v. Lange, 128 Idaho 129, 136, 910
P.2d 801, 808 (Ct.App.1996). Since the defendant in that case did not
present evidence that such conduct would have resulted in a -cure, or that
the retention of such services would be cost effective, Its mitigation
defense failed. Id.
Thus, when advancing a claim that the plaintiff failed to mitigate
damages, the defendant must prove both that a means of mitigation
existed and that the proposed course of mitigation would, in fact, have
resulted in a reduction of the plaintitrs damages.

!

1

I
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1

McConnack International USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920,924,277 P.3d 367,371
(2012). This is preciseiy what the BOCC has done in the instant case, provide a "mere
suggestion that a means of mitigation exists." Id. In this case, it was not even a "mere
sugge~tion"; the entire issue of S.B. being able to perfonn a full time job at Quatfon was
made up out of whole cloth by the BOCC. The· only "evidence" was a job advertisement;
there was no proof no evidence that an opening even existed at Qualfon at the time of
1
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the hearing. No one from Qualfon testified on that point. No one testified what the
physical, mental and emotional requirements of any job at Qualfon were. No one
testified what accommodations Qualfon could make for a person's physical or emotional
limitations. No one from Qualfon testified whether a person with essentially no computer
skills could perform the job.
Finally, when it imputed income, the BOCC failed to take into consideration the
fact that S.B. lived at her employers business, and bartered rent in lieu of pay for her
ability to live there. The BOCC did not take into consideration, nor did it elicit any

testimony, as to what S. B. would have to pay for rent if she left her current job to take a
job atQualfon.
Unlike St. Luke's, this is not a case where S.B. chose to make herse'lf indigent by
not working. The record shows S.B. did all she could to earn what she was capable of
earning, given her physical and mental health limitations. The BOCC's finding that S.B.
is not indigent at the present time when on prior occasions it consistently found her to be
indigent, is disingenuous.
From an appellate review standpoint, under I.C. § 67-5279(3), this Court finds the
decision of the BOCC was; (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions
(misreading the Medical lndlgency Act and St.Luke's); (b) in exces.s of the statutory
authority of the agency (misreading the Medical lndigency Act and St. Luke's); (c) made
upon unlawful procedure (shifting the burden of proof to KH and S.B.); (d) not supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole (disregarding the facts and the law);
and (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion (it is all three, based on the
reasons set forth above). Only one of those subsections was needed under I.C. § 675279, but the BOCC violated all five subsections. Additionally, this Court finds under
I.C. § 67-5279(4), that substantial rights of the appellant KH (and S.B.) have been
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prejudiced by the BOCC's decision.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.

For the reasons stated above, the decision of the BOCC denying medical
indlgency determination for amounts incurred in KH's treatment of S.B. is reversed.
This matter is remanded to the BOCC for proceedings consistent with this
memorandum opinion and order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the decision of the BOCC denying medical indigency
determination for amounts incurred in KH's treatment of S.B. is REVERSED. Under I.C.
§ 67•5279(3), this Court finds the decision of the BOCC was; (a) in violation of

constitutional or statutory provisions: (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole; and (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, this Court finds under I.C. § 67-5279(4), that substantial rights of the
appellant KH (and S.B.) have been prejudiced by the BOCC's decision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that S.B. is medically indigent.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED this matter is remanded to the BOCC for proceedings

consistent with this memorandum opinion and order.
Entered this 31st day of July, 2019.
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